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Modern medicine is evolving at a tremendous speed. On a daily basis, 
we learn about new treatments, drugs, medical devices, and diagnoses. 
Both established technology companies and start-ups focus on health-
related products and services in competition with traditional 
healthcare businesses. Telemedicine and electronic health records 
have the potential to improve the effectiveness of treatments 
significantly. Progress in the medical field depends above all on data, 
specifically health information. Physicians, researchers, and 
developers need health information to help patients by improving 
diagnoses, customizing treatments and finding new cures.
Yet law and policymakers are currently more focused on the fact 
that health information can also be used to harm individuals. Even 
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (which occurred after 
the manuscript for this article was largely finalized), the California 
Attorney General Becera made a point of announcing that he will not 
delay enforcement of the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), 
which his office estimated imposes a $55 billion cost (approximately 
1.8% of California Gross State Product) for initial compliance, not 
including costs of ongoing compliance, responses to data subject 
requests, and litigation.†
Risks resulting from health information processing are very real. 
Contact tracing and quarantines in response to SARS, MERS, and 
COVID-19 outbreaks curb civil liberties with similar effects to law 
enforcement investigations, arrests, and imprisonment. Even outside 
the unusual circumstances of a global pandemic, employers or 
insurance companies may disfavor individuals with pre-existing health 
conditions in connections with job offers and promotions as well as 
coverage and eligibility decisions. Some diseases carry a negative 
* Lothar Determann teaches computer, Internet, and data privacy law at Freie Univer
sität Berlin, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and Hastings College of the 
Law, San Francisco, and he practices technology law as a partner at Baker McKenzie in Palo 
Alto. Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and not of his firm, clients, or 
others. The author is grateful to Arian Grüner for assistance with research and editing from a 
legal and medical perspective, as well as valuable input from Prof. Dr. Ulrich M. Gassner, 
Priv-Doz. Dr. Felix Post, and Dr. Jasper zu Putlitz.
† See Joe Duball, California Attorney General’s Office: No Delay on CCPA En-
forcement Amid COVID-19, IAPP (Mar. 24, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/making-sense-of-
calls-to-delay-ccpa-enforcement-amidst-covid-19; see also Berkeley Economic Advising and 
Research, LLC, Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment: California Consumer Privacy 
Act of 2018 Regulations at 19 (Aug. 2019), www.dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Economics/Major
_Regulations/Major_Regulations_Table/documents/CCPA_Regulations-SRIA-DOF.pdf.
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stigma in social circumstances. To reduce the risks of such harms and 
protect individual dignity, governments around the world regulate the 
collection, use, and sharing of health information with ever stricter 
laws.
European countries have generally prohibited the processing of 
personal data, subject to limited exceptions, for which companies have 
to identify and then document or apply. The General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) that took effect in 2018 confirms and amplifies 
a rigid regulatory regime that was first introduced in the German State 
Hessen in 1970 and demands that organizations minimize the amount 
of data they collect, use, share, and retain. Healthcare and healthtech 
organizations have struggled to comply with this regime and have 
found EU data protection laws fundamentally hostile to data-driven 
progress in medicine.
The United States, on the other hand, has traditionally relied on 
sector- and harm-specific laws to protect privacy, including data 
privacy and security rules under the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and numerous state 
laws including the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act 
(“CMIA”) in California, which specifically address the collection and 
use of health information. So long as organizations observe the 
specific restrictions and prohibitions in sector-specific privacy laws, 
they may collect, use, and share health information. As a default rule 
in the United States, businesses are generally permitted to process 
personal information, including health information. Yet, recently, 
extremely broad and complex privacy laws have been proposed or 
enacted in some states, including the California Consumer Privacy Act 
of 2018 (“CCPA”), which have a potential to render compliance with 
data privacy laws impractical for most businesses, including those in 
the healthcare and healthtech sectors.
Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China is encouraging and 
incentivizing data-driven research and development by Chinese 
companies, including in the healthcare sector. Data-related legislation 
is focused on cybersecurity and securing access to data for Chinese 
government agencies and much less on individual privacy interests.
In Europe and the United States, the political pendulum has 
swung too far in the direction of ever more rigid data regulation and 
privacy laws, at the expense of potential benefits through medical
progress. This is literally unhealthy. Governments, businesses, and 
other organizations need to collect, use and share more personal 
health information, not less. The potential benefits of health data 
processing far outweigh privacy risks, which can be better tackled by 
harm-specific laws. If discrimination by employers and insurance 
companies is a concern, then lawmakers and law enforcement 
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agencies need to focus on anti-discrimination rules for employers and 
insurance companies - not prohibit or restrict the processing of 
personal data, which does not per se harm anyone.
The notion of only allowing data processing under specific 
conditions leads to a significant hindrance of medical progress by 
slowing down treatments, referrals, research, and development. It also 
prevents the use of medical data as a tool for averting dangers for the 
public good. Data “anonymization” and requirements for specific 
consent based on overly detailed privacy notices do not protect patient 
privacy effectively and unnecessarily complicate the processing of 
health data for medical purposes.
Property rights to personal data offer no solutions. Even if 
individuals - not companies creating databases - were granted 
property rights to their own data originally, this would not ultimately 
benefit individuals. Given that transfer and exclusion rights are at the 
core of property regimes, data property rights would threaten 
information freedom and privacy alike: after an individual sells her 
data, the buyer and new owner could exercise his data property rights 
to enjoin her and her friends and family from continued use of her 
personal data. Physicians, researchers, and developers would not 
benefit either; they would have to deal with property rights in addition 
to privacy and medical confidentiality requirements.
Instead of overregulating data processing or creating new 
property rights in data, lawmakers should require and incentivize 
organizations to earn and maintain the trust of patients and other data 
subjects and penalize organizations that use data in specifically 
prohibited ways to harm individuals. Electronic health records, 
improved notice and consent mechanisms, and clear legal frameworks 
will promote medical progress, reduce risks of human error, lower 
costs, and make data processing and sharing more reliable.
We need fewer laws like the GDPR or the CCPA that discourage 
organizations from collecting, using, retaining, and sharing personal 
information. Physicians, researchers, developers, drug companies, 
medical device manufacturers and governments urgently need better 
and increased access to personal health information. The future of 
medicine offers enormous opportunities. It depends on trust and 
healthy data protection. Some degree of data regulation is necessary, 
but the dose makes the poison. Laws that require or intend to promote 
the minimization of data collection, use, and sharing may end up 
killing more patients than hospital germs.
In this article, I promote a view that is decidedly different from 
that supported by the vast majority of privacy scholars, politicians, the 
media, and the broader zeitgeist in Europe and the United States. I am 
arguing for a healthier balance between data access and data 
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protection needs in the interest of patients’ health and privacy. I strive 
to identify ways to protect health data privacy without excessively 
hindering healthcare and medical progress. After an introduction (I), I 
examine current approaches to data protection regulation, privacy 
law, and the protection of patient confidentiality (II), risks associated 
with the processing of health data (III), needs to protect patient 
confidence (IV), risks for healthcare and medical progress (V), and 
possible solutions (VI). I conclude with an outlook and call for 
healthier approaches to data protection (VII).
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All of Us is the name of an ambitious project launched by the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) in 2017 to collect health data and genetic in-
formation from one million U.S. citizens in a national research database.
1
The title conveys a variety of meanings and associations. “All of Us” can 
mean “everyone” or “everything from us.” This ambiguity reflects how hu-
1. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, ALL OF US RESEARCH PROGRAM 
OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL 5 (March 28, 2018), https://allofus.nih.gov/sites/default/files/aou
_operational_protocol_v1.7_mar_2018.pdf; see also Lothar Determann and Felix Post, Ge-
sunder Datenschutz, in DIE ZUKUNFT DER MEDIZIN 317 (Erwin Böttinger & Jasper zu Putlitz 
eds., 2019).
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man beings have experienced their role in the development and application 
of new diagnoses, treatments, drugs, and medical devices over time.
I. MEDICINE GETS PERSONAL
“Everything from us” invokes the use of “big data” technologies in 
medicine. “Big data” is generally understood to mean analyzing particularly 
large volumes, variety, and velocity of data,
2
and often includes information 
that was originally collected for different purposes. “Everything from us”
implies the increasing collection of health data in the course of medical pro-
gress: resident doctors, hospitals, and health insurance companies keep pa-
tient files in electronic form; digital health apps accompany us in real time 
every step of the way.
3
More and more medical devices in hospitals and 
doctor’s offices, which previously offered independent and stand-alone 
functionalities, are now integrated into networks and deliver large amounts 
of data to be further processed and stored via clinic information systems 
(“CIS”) and software.
4
So-called “biobanks,” which are databases of biolog-
ical and genetic material, have been established and form the foundation on 
which digital processing and the exchange of genetic information takes 
place.
5
At the same time, telemedicine, in which medical consultation and
treatment is carried out remotely and online, has grown exponentially, 
sometimes making the personal interaction between patient and doctor ob-
solete altogether.
6
The wealth of existing data, including increasing infor-
mation about the genetic composition of human beings, provides new op-
portunities for medical research and treatment.
7
Medication and treatment 
options tailored to the patient’s specific life circumstances, environmental 
2. The concept has been described as the three Vs by Doug Laney in 2001. See Doug 
Laney, 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety, META
GROUP INC. (Feb. 6, 2001), http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-
Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf.
3. See, e.g., STANFORD MED., STANFORD MEDICINE 2017 HEALTH TRENDS REPORT:
HARNESSING THE POWER OF DATA IN HEALTH 15 (2017).
4. For an overview of CIS, see Donte, What Is A Clinical Information System (CIS)?,
BIOHEALTHMATICS (June 19, 2018), http://www.biohealthmatics.com/technologies/hospital-
information-systems/clinical-information-systems.
5. For the past and present role of biobanks and the challenges going forward, see
Yvonne G. De Souza & John S. Greenspan, Biobanking Past, Present and Future: Responsi-
bilities and Benefits, 27 AIDS 303, 303 (2013).
6. Between March 8 and 11, 2018, German doctors debated loosening the ban on re-
mote treatment at the 121st annual meeting of German doctors in Erfurt, Thuringia. Personal 
treatment is still supposed to be the “gold standard,” but they eventually came up with a solu-
tion that will allow doctors to treat patients only using electronic communication without see-
ing them first. Mediziner beschliessen Ausbau von Onlinesprechstunden, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(May 10, 2018, 8:45 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/aerztetag-mediziner-
beschliessen-mehr-onlinesprechstunden-a-1207181.html.
7. Charles Auffray et al., Making Sense of Big Data in Health Research: Towards an 
EU Action Plan, 8 GENOME MED. 1, 1 (2016).
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factors, and biological-genetic predisposition are developed under the terms 
“precision medicine”
8
and “pharmacogenetics,” i.e., medication tailored to 
the genetic conditions of the patient.
9
All this makes the medicine of the Twenty-first century more data-
intensive and personal.
10
The collection of health data offers opportunities 
for better analysis of disease factors, improved diagnostic methods, and 
higher chances of finding cures as well as a reduction of medical costs and 
an increased efficiency of the healthcare system.
11
At the same time, pa-
tients, physicians, researchers, and developers face new risks as a result of 
the processing of the collected data.
12
These risks range from discrimination 
and stigmatization based on the data obtained to unwanted knowledge about 
one’s own health and even the fraudulent misuse of data or blackmailing.
13
Twenty-first century medicine challenges the current legal system.
The handling of health data is regulated via data protection regulations, 
privacy laws, and medical confidentiality requirements. In recent years, 
lawmakers in many countries have passed more and stricter data protection 
and privacy laws.
14
This poses a potential threat to future data-based and 
preventive medicine. Rigid data privacy and security requirements can ren-
der the collection of patient data and its exchange between different 
healthcare facilities complex, labor-intensive, and costly. This can result in 
delays in the treatment process. Also, entities are discouraged from sharing 
personal data, which can result in less informed diagnoses and treatment de-
cisions. Even without strict data privacy laws, healthcare providers feel gen-
erally obligated to keep health information confidential and implement data 
security measures given the potential effects of data security breaches on 
individual patients.
15
At the same time, the three areas of medicine—
8. Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372
N. ENG. J. MED. 793, 793 (2015).
9. Stuart A. Scott, Personalizing Medicine with Clinical Pharmacogenetics, 13
GENETIC MED. 987, 987 (2011).
10. Wullianallur Raghupathi & Viju Raghupathi, Big Data Analytics in Healthcare: 
Promise and Potential, 2 HEALTH INFO. SCI. & SYS. 1, 1-2 (2014).
11. Back in 2011, a report of the McKinsey Global Institute estimated the value big 
data could potentially create in the U.S. healthcare system alone to be over $300 billion per 
year with more than one third coming from cost reductions. See J. MANYIKA ET AL., BIG
DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE 2,7 (2011).
12. See, e.g., Marco Viceconti et al., Big Data, Big Knowledge: Big Data for Personal-
ized Healthcare, 19 IEEE J. OF BIOMED. & HEALTH INFORMATICS 1209 (2015).
13. For an overview of healthcare data breaches in the year 2018, see The Biggest 
Healthcare Breaches of 2018 (So Far), HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (March 2018), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/projects/biggest-healthcare-data-breaches-2018-so-far.
14. Tim Mullahy, Privacy Law Is Growing More Extensive – Here’s What That Means 
For Healthcare, TRIPWIRE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security
/healthcare/privacy-law-healthcare.
15. Annie Qureshi calls a healthcare data breach “one of the most violating types of 
data breaches one can encounter.” See Annie Qureshi, Healthcare Data Breaches: What Are 
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namely, the treatment of diseases, their prevention, and the further devel-
opment of existing treatment and prevention methods—continue to demand 
comprehensive data processing.
16
This article looks for a healthy balance between data access and data 
protection in the interest of patients’ health and privacy. It seeks to identify 
ways to protect health data privacy without excessively hindering healthcare 
and medical progress. After this introduction (I), this article examines cur-
rent approaches to data protection regulation, privacy law, and the protec-
tion of patient confidentiality (II), risks associated with the processing of 
health data (III), needs to protect patient confidence (IV), risks for 
healthcare and medical progress (V), and possible solutions (VI). It con-
cludes with an outlook and call for healthier approaches to data protection 
(VII).
II. DATA PROTECTION REGULATION, PRIVACY LAW, AND
PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
The protection of one’s privacy and data is a global issue. Many inter-
national treaties and national constitutions refer, expressly or impliedly, to 
privacy as a core principle or objective.
17
On the national level, the regula-
tions differ from each other, especially when it comes to health data. In Eu-
rope, the processing of health data is regulated by general, omnibus data 
processing regulations. In the United States, sector- and harm-specific pri-
vacy laws apply. In most countries, in addition to data privacy and data pro-
tection laws, physicians have to protect patient confidentiality under laws or 
regulations concerning professional responsibilities.
A. Data Protection Regulation and Privacy Law
1. Europe
With data protection laws, European countries seek to protect the indi-
vidual (the “data subject”) from potential adverse effects of automated data 
processing by generally prohibiting the processing of personal data, subject 
to only enumerated exceptions. The member states of the European Union 
(“EU”) harmonized data protection law with the EU General Data Protec-
tion Regulation 2016/679 (“GDPR”), which is directly applicable in all 
the Risks?, HEALTHWORKS COLLECTIVE (April 8, 2018), https://www.healthworks
collective.com/healthcare-data-breaches-what-risks.
16. STANFORD MED., supra note 3.
17. For an overview, see Lothar Determann, Privacy and Data Protection, MOSCOW J.
INT’L L. 18, 20-21 (2019).
Spring 2020] Healthy Data Protection 237
member states of the European Economic Area (“EEA”)
18
and applies to 
companies within and outside the EEA in most cases where either the con-
troller, processor,
19
or data subject is based in the EU.
20
According to EU data protection law, organizations must not process 
personal data unless they can provide a justification expressly recognized by 
law. EU lawmakers reversed the general presumption of liberty (everything 
is allowed if it is not prohibited)
21
for the field of data processing and data 
protection law; now, processing of personal data is prohibited unless it is 
permitted. According to the GDPR, organizations must not process personal 
data unless they meet all requirements of the regulation and national laws 
and they can claim one of six “legal bases”: (a) the data subject has given 
consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific 
purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the 
data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) 
processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data sub-
ject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the perfor-
mance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purpos-
es of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, 
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal 
data.
22
To be valid, consent must be a “freely given, specific, informed and un-
ambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the pro-
cessing of personal data relating to him or her.”
23
Additional requirements 
are noted in Article 7 of the GDPR. Most importantly, any respective decla-
ration has to be unambiguous and based on a clear and easily accessible re-
quest for consent. Also, the consent must be revocable at any time.
18. EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. See EEA Agreement,
EFTA, https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
19. These two terms are defined in Article 4 (7) and (8) of the GDPR with the “control-
ler” being a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” and 
the “processor” is a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 3(1), 
4(7)-(8), 2016 O.J. (L 119/32-33).
20. Id. art. 3.
21. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2016), https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/rule-of-la.
22. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119/36).
23. Id. art. 4(11).
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European data protection laws are intended to prevent or restrict the 
processing of personal data as much as possible, even with regard to public-
ly available data. “Personal data” includes any information related to an 
identified or identifiable person, such as a person’s name on a business card, 
a date of birth combined with a patient ID only known to the treating hospi-
tal, an image on security footage, or the IP address of a device that belongs 
to one individual.
24
According to this broad definition, the data itself does 
not have to identify the data subject – it is enough if it can be associated 
with an identifiable person. The Court of Justice of the European Union has 
decided that data has to be considered “personal” if the company or body 
collecting the data in question “has the legal means which enable it to iden-
tify the data subject with additional data which the [company or body] has 
about that person.”
25
Data ceases to be “personal” only if it is aggregated in 
a statistical statement or redacted so thoroughly that it can no longer be 
connected with an identifiable individual. Effective anonymization is very 
difficult to achieve in practice,
26
however, and aggregated or anonymized 
data is far less useful for medical treatment, research, or development than 
personal data.
“Processing of personal data” is broadly defined as any act related to 
personal data, such as the collection, storage, transmission, linking or dele-
tion of such data, whether manual or automated, and even redaction and de-
letion are regulated and restricted as “processing.”
27
Any data processing 
action is subject to extensive restrictions. For example, with regard to the 
type and frequency of use, authorized users, and storage periods, processing 
must be limited to what is required for the purpose of processing (principle 
of data minimization) and must be carried out transparently (principle of 
transparency) and for a clearly defined purpose (principle of purpose limita-
tion).
28
Data can only be collected for specific and precisely defined purpos-
es while the amount collected has to be as small as possible and the data 
subject must be granted broad access to the entire process whenever re-
quested.
These requirements are diametrically opposed to the concept of “big da-
ta,” which relies on large volumes of data that were frequently collected for 
other purposes and are now analyzed for new insights or connections (e.g.,
24. Id. art. 4(1).
25. The court qualified an IP address as “personal data” based on the definition used in 
the Data Protection Directive of the EU/Directive 95/46/EC which corresponds to that of the 
GDPR. The operator of a website does not have to be able to identify a user himself to qualify 
the IP address as “personal data.” It is enough if public authorities are able to do so with the 
help of the network provider. See Case C-582/14, Beyer v. Bundessrepublik Deutschland,
2016 E.C.J. I-779.
26. See infra Part II(2).
27. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33.
28. Id. art. 5(1)(a-c).
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correlations of exposure to a certain part of town to the development of par-
ticular diseases after new scientific discoveries create suspicions regarding 
potential causal links).
Individuals affected by data processing are entitled to extensive rights. 
They have a right to disclosures and access,
29
meaning they have to be in-
formed whether their data is processed, which data in particular is pro-
cessed, the purposes of data processing, and the recipients along with other 





The “right to be forgotten” contemplates certain exceptions in Ar-
ticle 17(3)(c) and (d) for public health and scientific research,
32
but an entity 
that relied on patient consent to collect data in the first place will lose the 
legal basis for retaining such data if the data subject withdraws her consent, 
which she is entitled to do at any time.
EU law also imposes far-reaching restrictions on the transfer of data 
abroad.
33
Cross-border transfers are of significant importance for global 
medical studies and international research projects and are generally prohib-
ited in Chapter V of the GDPR, subject to complex and narrow exceptions.
34
The EU Commission has only recognized a few countries as providing for 
an “adequate” level of data protection.
35
Such positive adequacy decisions 
have been made regarding Andorra, Argentina, Canada, the Faroe Islands, 
Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
and Uruguay.
36
Regarding the United States, the EU Commission has issued 
only a limited adequacy decision with respect to companies that register 
voluntarily under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield program that the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce administers and whose principles the Federal Trade 
Commission enforces.
37
In the absence of an adequacy decision by the EU Commission, organi-
zations can achieve an adequate level of data protection by implementing 
“appropriate safeguards.” Article 46(2) of the GDPR sets out a list of safe-
guards acceptable to the EU, which include: legally binding and enforceable 
29. Id. art. 15(1).
30. Id. art. 20.
31. Id. art. 17.
32. Namely if the processing is necessary for (the vague concept of ) “public interest”
and “scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.” Id. art. 17(3).
33. See LOTHAR DETERMANN, DETERMANN’S FIELD GUIDE TO DATA PRIVACY LAW
31 (2020).
34. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, arts. 44–49, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 60–65.
35. See id. art. 45(1).
36. Adequacy Decisions: How the EU Determines if a Non-EU Country Has an Ade-
quate Level of Data Protection, EURO. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic
/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries
_de#dataprotectionincountriesoutsidetheeu (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
37. European Commission, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 
July 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 11.
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instruments between public authorities or bodies, binding corporate rules, 
standard contractual clauses promulgated by the EU Commission, an ap-
proved code of conduct, and approved certification mechanisms.
38
A trans-
fer without an adequacy decision by the Commission or the described safe-
guards is only possible under certain circumstances listed in Article 49(1) 
GDPR. Explicit consent of the data subject is one of such exceptions, but 
the EU Data Protection Board has opined that consent is only appropriate in 
specific circumstances and not available as a general compliance mecha-
nism.
39
With respect to health data, which is defined in European law as “per-
sonal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, in-
cluding the provision of health care services which reveal information about 
his or her health status,”
40
the regulation is even more complex and there are 
further restrictions. Health data is classified as a “special category” as de-
scribed in Article 9(1) of the GDPR, regardless of how sensitive information 
pertaining to one’s health is; for example, glasses or a Band-Aid visible on 
security footage or a scanning of a public road by an autonomously-driving 
car will turn the entire data set into one containing “special categories of 
personal data,” because they contain information on an individual’s health. 
Processing of health data is prohibited unless the data subject has given her 
explicit consent for one or more specified purposes or the processing is nec-
essary for health or medical purposes, in which case the data may be “pro-
cessed by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to the obliga-
tion of professional secrecy” without consent.
41
For medical research, Article 9(2)(j) and Article 89 of the GDPR con-
tain several exceptions to the general rules concerning consent and access 
rights while still requiring certain safeguards. Articles 9(2)(h), 9(2)(j), and 
89 of the GDPR allow EU Member States to legislate additional derogations 
from several provisions of the GDPR concerning the rights of data subjects. 
For example, in Germany, Article 22 of the new German Federal Data Pro-
tection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) (“BDSG”) names several exceptions 
from the GDPR requirements for processing data of a special category. Such 
processing is allowed in Germany, for example, for social security admin-
istration purposes and for preventive medicine and public health interests, as 
well as to prevent public harm. At the same time, various necessary safe-
guards are described in Section 2 of the BDSG, pseudonymization being 
38. See Lothar Determann et al., The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Versus Other EU Data 
Transfer Compliance Options, 15 DATA PRIV. & SEC. L. REP. (BNA) (Sept. 5, 2016).
39. See European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 2/2018 on Derogations of Article 
49 Under Regulation 2016/679, GUIDELINES (May 25, 2018), http://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb
/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_2_2018_derogations_en.pdf.
40. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(15), 2016 O.J. (L 119/34).
41. Id. art. 9.
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one of them.
42
Also, Article 27 of the BDSG justifies a limitation on the 
rights of the data subject under the GDPR if the data processing is necessary 
for research purposes and the interests of the controller outweigh those of 
the data subject. However, in addition to the safeguards already mentioned 
in Section 22 of the BDSG, special categories of personal data have to be 
anonymized as soon as possible after they have been processed for their 
original purpose.
43
The leeway granted to EU Member States to legislate 
derogations from the GDPR enables the creation of a legal patchwork that 
makes it more difficult for research institutions and companies to conduct 
international studies or exchange data across borders.
In addition to data protection laws, treating physicians and researchers 
have to comply with Regulation (EU) 536/2014 on Clinical Trials on Me-
dicinal Products for Human Use, which standardizes authorization proce-
dures, safety necessities, and the requirements for consent to participate in 
clinical trials.
44
This further complicates the preparation of consent forms 
and adds restrictions to the subsequent use and sharing of information de-
rived from clinical trials.
2. The United States
In contrast to the situation in Europe, data processing is generally per-
mitted in the United States.
45
There is no comprehensive federal legislation 
on privacy or data protection comparable to the GDPR. The U.S. Constitu-
tion covers and protects certain aspects of privacy in its Fourth Amendment, 
but without explicitly using the term.
46
Privacy risks and harms are ad-
dressed in sector- and harm-specific privacy laws, which are tailored to in-
dustries and risks.
47
Health data is subject to the provisions of the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which requires healthcare sector or-
ganizations to implement detailed technical and organizational security 
measures, disclose data processing practices to patients, and obtain consent 
in certain limited situations. HIPAA was adopted to “ensure the portability 
of health benefits when workers change or lose their jobs and will protect 
workers against discrimination by health plans based on their health sta-
42. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG][Federal Data Protection Act], June 30, 2017, 
BGBL I at 2097, amended by Nov. 20, 2019, BGBL I at 1626, art. 22(1) (Ger.). For a defini-
tion of “pseudonymization,” see Part II(2)(a) below.
43. Id. art. 27(3).
44. Council Regulation 536/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 158).
45. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910-16 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 257, 
349-61 (5th ed. 2014); see ANDREW B. SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND COMPLIANCE § 7.1, § 28 (2014).
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tus.”
48
It covers hospitals, healthcare providers, and their billing service pro-
viders.
49
Its Privacy Rule regulates the use of protected health information 
(“PHI”)
50
- defined in 45 CFR § 160.103 as any information held by the 
covered entities regarding health status, provision of health care, or health 
care payment that can be linked to any individual.
51
The disclosure of such 
information is based on the patient’s express written authorization,
52
with 
some exceptions for specific circumstances, such as a legal requirement for 
disclosure.
53
Under HIPAA, patients have rights to access their health data, 
but, unlike under the GDPR, no “right to be forgotten” or erasure.
54
In addition to HIPAA, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects, also known as the “Common Rule,” published in 1991 and revised 
in 2017 (the revised version went into effect on January 21, 2019), sets
standards for “all research involving human subjects conducted, supported, 
or otherwise subject to regulation by any Federal department or agency.”
55
It 
applies to all research that involves identifiable data about living individuals 
and is conducted, funded, or regulated by one of the Common Rule depart-
ments or agencies.
56
To comply with the Common Rule, a research institu-
tion has to submit a written assurance of compliance with the Common Rule 
to the head of a department or agency
57
and the study has to be reviewed by 
an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”)
58
at least once a year, making sure 
that the risks for the data subjects are minimized and informed consent has 





can be terminated. Besides that, the Common Rule does not grant 
48. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/documents/statement-signing-the-health-insurance-portability-and-accountability-act-1996.
49. The definitions of “covered entities” and “business associates” can be found in 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
50. See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, Health Information Privacy, HHS,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last updat-
ed July 26, 2013).
51. § 160.103.
52. Id. § 164.508(a).
53. Id. § 164.502(a)(2).
54. Stacey A. Tovino, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and the EU GDPR: Illustrative Com-
parisons, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 973, 990 (2017).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2019).
56. The definitions of “research” and “human subject” are available in id. § 46.102(l)
and § 46.102(e)(1) respectively.
57. Id. § 46.103(a).
58. Id. § 46.107. An IRB has to have least five members of varying backgrounds, at 
least one scientific and non-scientific member and at least one not affiliated with the institu-
tion. See id. § 46.107.
59. Id. § 46.123.
60. Id. § 46.113.
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research participants legal remedies in regard to their participation.
61
It 
should also be noted, that certain low-risk studies conducted by HIPAA-
covered entities are exempted from the Common Rule.
62
Numerous additional laws apply at the state level. For example, the 
State of California has issued regulations for online services in the form of 
the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”).
63
It also covers 
providers of software, hardware, and online services as “providers of 
healthcare” and provides in California Civil Code 56.10(a) that “a provider 
of health care, health care service plan, or contractor” is not allowed to “dis-
close medical information regarding a patient,” unless it is authorized by the 
patient.
64
On June 28, 2018, California passed the California Consumer Privacy 
Act (“CCPA”) that is set to come into force on January 1, 2020. Already 
subject to harsh criticism,
65
the CCPA affects most companies worldwide 
and poses significant organizational challenges.
66
Any business is covered if 
it does business in California, remotely or with a physical presence, obtains 
any personal information of any California resident, and exceeds one of 
three thresholds, (1) generates annual gross revenues of $25 million, (2) 
processes personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, 
households, or devices annually, or (3) generates 50% of annual revenue 
from selling California residents’ personal information.
67
“Personal infor-
mation” is defined more broadly than even “personal data” is defined under 
the GDPR as “any information that . . . relates to . . .
a particular consumer or household.”
68
“Selling” is any disclosure 
of personal information or making available personal information 
for monetary or other valuable consideration. This definition of 
selling thus covers most types of data exchanges in practice, given 
that businesses tend to share information only for consideration and 
consideration is a basic element of any contract.
69
“Consumer”
61. Jessica L Roberts & Valerie Gutmann Koch, Law vs. Regulations in the Common 
Rule, YALE J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016), https://yjolt.org/blog/law-vs-regulations-
common-rule.
62. § 46.104(d)(4).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (West 2020).
64. Id. § 56.10(a).
65. Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), in
SANTA CLARA UNIV. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 1 (2018).
66. Lothar Determann, New California Law Against Data Sharing, 35 COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW 1, 2 (2018).
67. California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(c)(1) (West 2020).
68. Id. § 1798.140(o).
69. Id. § 1798.140(t). Provides for some exceptions, including consumer-directed dis-
closures to third parties that do not sell the personal information, limited sharing with service 
providers, and business transfers in bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), and simi-
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means any resident, including employees, representatives of busi-
nesses, students, or patients.
70
Businesses are required to comply 
with numerous prescribed requirements, including disclosures us-
ing exact statutory language and organization, the implementation 
of an online opt-out link to enable consumers to prohibit the sale of 
their personal information,
71
and the granting of new data subject 
rights, including access, erasure, and portability,
72
as well as chan-
nels to exercise the (e.g. a toll-free telephone number). For compa-
nies or entities governed by HIPAA or CMIA, the CCPA contains 
limited exceptions, but they still have to comply with the CCPA to 
the extent they do not act as a “covered entity” or a “provider of 
healthcare” (e.g., regarding employees or website visitors) or they 
process data that does not qualify as “protected health information”
under HIPAA or “medical information” under CMIA.
73
Thus, even 
healthcare providers have to comply with the CCPA. And, more 
importantly, other businesses are discouraged from sharing data 
with organizations in the healthcare sector due to the rigid re-
strictions imposed by the CCPA on data sharing. As a consequence, 
less information will be available to researchers and developers 
when the CCPA takes effect.
3. China
In China, the concepts of data protection and data privacy laws are rela-
tively new. During a period of uncompromising growth, data protection 
regulations and privacy laws were few, fragmented, and sector-specific.
74
Personal data of more than a billion citizens has been available for collec-
tion and processing by Chinese researchers and businesses without re-
strictions similar to those found in Europe or the United States.
75
While 
lawmakers in the EU and United States are more concerned with individual 
privacy, regulating data processing, and restricting technology companies, 
lar transactions. To avail themselves of such exceptions, however, most business will have to
adapt their existing contracts and processes.
70. Id. § 1798.140(g).
71. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1).
72. Id. § 1798.100, 105.
73. Id. § 1798.145(c).
74. Graham Greenleaf & Scott Livingston, China’s New Cybersecurity Law – Also a 
Data Privacy Law?, 144 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 1-7 (2016).
75. Luxia Zhang et al. provide an overview of the increasing role of big data in medical 
research in China and name respective regulation as a challenge going forward by suggesting 
to “follow Confucian doctrine to ensure that we obtain true value for medicine - that is, to 
learn extensively, inquire carefully, think deeply, discriminate clearly, and practice faithfully.”
See Luxia Zhang et al., Big Data and Medical Research in China, 360:j5158 BMJ CLINICAL 
RES. 3 (Feb. 5, 2018).
Spring 2020] Healthy Data Protection 245
the Chinese government is encouraging large Chinese technology compa-
nies to advance and intensify their data processing to gain leadership posi-
tions in artificial intelligence.
76
Most recently, China has focused on data security and local data availa-
bility. In June 2017, the Chinese Cybersecurity Law (“CSL”) came into ef-
fect, followed by the Personal Information Security Specification (the “PI 
Security Specification”) in May 2018, a standard that will be used as a 
measure of compliance with China’s existing data protection rules.
77
With
these measures, the Chinese government seeks to ease access to personal 
data for the Chinese government, to safeguard social stability, to facilitate 
censorship and surveillance, and to protect domestic industries from global 
competition.
78
The definitional scope of the Chinese Cybersecurity law is comparable 
to that of the GDPR and CCPA, covering any “personal information,” de-
fined as “all kinds of information, recorded electronically or through other 
means, that taken alone or together with other information, is sufficient to 
identify a natural person’s identity, including but not limited to natural per-
sons’ full names, birth dates, national identification numbers, personal bio-
metric information, addresses, telephone numbers, and so forth” in Article 
76(5) of the CSL.
79
The information does not have to identify the data sub-
ject directly (“or together with other information”).
80
The scope is further 
extended by the PI Security Specification, referring to “all kinds of infor-
mation . . . to identify a specific natural person or reflect activities of a spe-
cific natural person.”
81
Health data is not considered as a special category of 
data and therefore not regulated specifically. Instead it is explicitly named 
as one example for “personal information” in the PI Security Specification.
82
Overall, data protection in China is not seen primarily as an instrument 
to secure the individual’s privacy but first and foremost as a matter of and a 
tool for national security
83
and to protect Chinese data from foreign influ-
76. Meng Jing & Sarah Dai, China Recruits Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent to AI “Na-
tional Team”, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-
tech/article/2120913/china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team.
77. Graham Greenleaf & Scott Livingston, China’s Personal Information Standard: 
The Long March to a Privacy Law, 150 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP 25 (2017).
78. For an in-depth discussion of these concerns, see Jyh-An Lee, Hacking into China’s
Cybersecurity Law, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 57 (2018).
79. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (
) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 76(5) (2016).
80. Id.
81. To which extent the references to “activities of a specific person” actually changes 
the understanding of “personal information” is debatable, but it can at least in theory be seen
as an extension of the respective definitions in other regulations. See Greenleaf supra note 77, 
at 25-28.
82. See Geren Xinxi Chujing Anquan Pingu Banfa ( )
[China’s Personal Information Security Specification], § 3.1 (2017).
83. See Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 1.
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ence.
84
According to Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law, “personal infor-
mation” and “important data” must be stored within mainland China and 
can only be transferred outside of China if “the measures jointly formulated 
by the State cybersecurity and information departments and the relevant de-
partments of the State Council to conduct a security assessment” are fol-
lowed.
85
The Article refers to “critical information infrastructure” (“CII”).
86
Article 31 gives some examples for such CII, including “other critical in-
formation infrastructure,” and leaves it to the State Council to formulate the 
specific scope.
87
In a later draft on “Regulations on Protection of Critical In-
formation Infrastructure,” healthcare is named as one of the industries con-
sidered CII.
88
In China, privacy and control over one’s own data is not perceived as 
much of an issue as in Europe or the United States.
89
While lawmakers in 
Europe keep adding restrictions on data processing to protect individual pri-
vacy, China is working on implementing a “social credit system” by 2020,
90
which already shows early effects.
91
With this system, everyone’s behavior 
in different areas of life will be evaluated by giving points that add up to an 
individual score, all by using and processing huge amounts of data.
92
B. Consent and Anonymization
Around the world, healthcare providers and researchers rely primarily 
on three measures to protect patient privacy: they limit the use of health in-
formation to what is necessary to treat the patient, they obtain consent from 
the patient to secondary or unusual data usages, and they redact or aggregate 
information so that the individual cannot be identified or associated with the 
84. Lee supra note 78, at 69.
85. Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 37.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 31.
88. Graham Webster et al., Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection 
Regulations, CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA (July 12, 2017), https://chinacopyright
andmedia.wordpress.com/2017/07/10/critical-information-infrastructure-security-protection-
regulations.
89. Hui Zhao & Haoxin Dong, Research on Personal Privacy Protection of China in 
the Era of Big Data, 5 OPEN J. SOC. SCIS. 139, 144 (June 19, 2017).
90. Alexandra Ma, China Has Started Ranking Citizens with a Creepy “Social Credit”
System — Here’s What You Can Do Wrong, and the Embarrassing, Demeaning Ways They 
Can Punish You, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/china-social-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4.
91. Don Reisinger, China Banned 23 Million People From Traveling Last Year for 
Poor “Social Credit” Scores, FORTUNE (Feb. 22, 2019, 9:34 AM), http://fortune.com/2019/02
/22/china-social-credit-travel-ban.
92. Bernard Marr, Chinese Social Credit Score: Utopian Big Data Bliss Or Black Mir-
ror On Steroids?, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bernardmarr/2019/01/21/chinese-social-credit-score-utopian-big-data-bliss-or-black-mirror-
on-steroids/#b85663a48b83.
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data. Patients and their privacy can be protected with one or more of these 
precautions in combination.
93
Steps to redact or de-identify personal data are certainly helpful in pro-
tecting patient privacy, although the term “anonymization” is usually a eu-
phemism. Seeking consent from a patient can strengthen information self-
determination rights and by extension perceptions of privacy. But, the effec-
tiveness of anonymization and consent approaches are increasingly being 
put to the test by the acquisition and processing of ever-larger amounts of 
health data in the age of modern medicine.
94
1. Anonymization
Anonymization means “remov[ing] identifying information from 
(something, such as computer data) so that the original source cannot be 
known.”
95
The term is frequently used in privacy policies and consent 
forms, but not usually in statutes. In the GDPR, for example, “anonymiza-
tion” is not used or defined. Article 4 of the GDPR only defines pseudony-
mization as “the processing of personal data in such a manner that the per-
sonal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the 
use of additional information, provided that such additional information is 
kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to 
ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”
96
Pseudonymization is referred to throughout the GDPR 
several times as a recommended data security measure. “Anonymous data”
is simply data that is not “personal data” for purposes of the GDPR, because 
it does not relate to an identifiable individual.
97
Similarly, the CCPA does not use the term “anonymization” but refers 
to “deidentification” and “aggregation.”
98
“Aggregate consumer infor-
mation” is defined as information that “relates to a group or category of 
consumers, from which individual consumer identities have been removed, 
that is not linked or reasonably linkable to any consumer or household, in-
cluding via a device” and does not mean “one or more individual consumer 
records that have been deidentified.”
99
Aggregate information typically con-
93. See Naya Sethi & Graeme T. Laurie, Delivering Proportionate Governance in the 
Era of eHealth: Making Linkage and Privacy Work Together, 13 MED. LAW INT. 168 (2013).
94. Menno Mostert et al., Big Data in Medical Research and EU Data Protection Law: 
Challenges to the Consent or Anonymise Approach, 24 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 956 (2016).
95. Anonymize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/anonymize, (last visited February 4, 2019).
96. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119/33-35).
97. Even though not defined in the Articles of the GDPR, Recital 26 states that the 
GDPR is not applicable to “anonymous data.” Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 26, 2016 
O.J. (L 119/5).
98. See California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o), (h) (West 
2020).
99. Id. § 1798.140(a).
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sists of statistical information concerning a sufficiently large number of per-
sons (e.g., X% of males older than 50 in country Y are overweight) that 
does not imply information on a particular individual. Aggregate infor-
mation falls outside the scope of the CCPA and most other privacy laws. 
The deidentification standard in the CCPA, however, can hardly be met in 
practice, because any information can be associated with an individual; only 
statistical statements can be detached from individuals.
100
When evaluating the actual value and usability of aggregated, redacted, 
de-identified, pseudonymized, or anonymized data, differences apply with 
respect to diagnosis and treatment of patients on the one hand, and on the 
other hand to the use of data for research and development purposes. In the 
case of medical treatment and care of a specific patient, be it by means of 
telemedicine using remote communication techniques or the “classic”
treatment at a doctor’s office, anonymization of health data is often not an 
option because of the risk of losing the connection to the patient. Every 
treatment is based on the specific physical and mental condition of the indi-
vidual. Laboratory values, test results, or X-ray images can only lead to a 
reliable diagnosis when they are unequivocally connected to a patient. 
Therefore, complete anonymization would make it nearly impossible to treat 
a patient if any kind of medical diagnostics should be necessary. Partial re-
daction of lab reports or images are recommended for data security and pri-
vacy purposes (e.g., replacement of patient names with ID numbers), but 
such measures introduce additional risks for misidentification and never 
completely rule out the patient’s identification. Also, researchers find data 
sets more useful if they contain as much individual information as possible. 
If they want to prove a new correlation or causal connection, researchers are 
interested in information that relates to individuals including that which was 
not previously recorded for this purpose (because no one had thought of the 
possible causal connection or correlation). The more data sets are redacted, 
the less valuable they are for research. On the other hand, for data pro-
cessing in medical research or internal auditing of health care facilities, 
where the personal identity of the patient is not necessarily needed, it may 
be less problematic to redact data sets.
Aside from questions regarding desirability and value of de-identified 
data, organizations find it extremely difficult or impossible to completely 
anonymize personal data. So long as information relates to one individual, 
there is a chance that this individual can be identified. Only aggregate in-
formation relating to groups can be truly anonymous. Encryption or coding 
measures such as the already mentioned pseudonymization, are not suffi-
100. See id. § 1798.140(h). “Deidentified” means “information that cannot reasonably 
identify, relate to, describe, be capable of being associated with, or be linked, directly or indi-
rectly, to a particular consumer.” Any personal information, however, can be associated with a 
person.
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cient in this regard as long as one person still has the “key” to re-identifying 
the individual data subject. Erasing all personal references is difficult to 
achieve due to numerous reference data sources.
101
The data subject might 
be re-identified using these. The re-identification of the medical data of 
Massachusetts Governor William Weld in 1997 is a well-known example in 
this regard.
102
He had collapsed during a public event and a researcher 
gained access to his medical records from a Massachusetts Group Insurance 
Commission (“GIC”) database by using his zip code and birth date.
103
Es-
sentially, what was considered to be anonymization for a long time is actu-
ally de-identification.
104
Some see this concept as insufficient and limited 
due to the mentioned possibility of re-identification.
105
Others point out that 
the risk of such re-identification is often so low that de-identification is still 
a useful tool for data protection.
106
In any case, complete anonymization is 
hard to achieve and often more of a “myth” than reality.
107
The substantial 
and continuous increase in available computing power and the easier and 
faster detection of information from digital sources have facilitated the link-
ing of different data sets and thus enabled identification by merging differ-
ent data sources.
108
Also, as advances have been made in human genome research, health 
data increasingly includes genetic information, which cannot be irrevocably 
and completely de-identified given the uniqueness of DNA.
109
Several indi-
vidual studies have shown that redacted genetic information of study partic-
ipants can still be used to identify individuals with other publicly accessible 
studies and non-health data, such as the year of birth or place of residence of 
101. Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV.
703, 710-11 (2016).
102. For a summary of the incident and critical view on the actual impact of the case on 
the anonymization debate, see Daniel C. Barth-Jones, The “Re-Identification” of Governor 
William Weld’s Medical Information: A Critical Re-Examination of Health Data Identifica-
tion Risks and Privacy Protections, Then and Now (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2076397).
103. Id.
104. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) describes de-
identification as “a tool that organizations can use to remove personal information from data 
that they collect, use, archive, and share with other organizations.” See Simson L. Garfinkel, 
De-Identification of Personal Information, NISTIR 8053, at 4 (2015), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov
/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.pdf.
105. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701 (2010).
106. Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35-36
(2011).
107. Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra, note 101, at 704.
108. See Ohm, supra note 105.
109. Benjamin E. Berkman et al., The Ethics of Large-Scale Genomic Research, in
ETHICAL REASONING IN BIG DATA: AN EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS 53, 54 (Jeff Collmann & 
Sorin Adam Matei eds., 2016) (noting that “all genomic data is theoretically identifiable”).
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the person affected.
110
For example, in 2013, a researcher was able to re-
identify more than 40% of a sample of anonymous participants of a DNA 
study by only primarily using their zip code, gender, and date of birth.
111
Such identification is likely to increase even more with further collection of 
health data, especially via social media or fitness trackers.
In addition, anonymizing data has several downsides. Much medical re-
search is based on accumulating certain information and then drawing con-
clusions from it. Statistics can help to detect a possible correlation Z be-
tween factor X and outcome Y. But, without a link between X and Y, there 
is no Z. The individual person is that link. This connection is important in 
the field of genetic research and public health (e.g., the prevention of epi-
demics or the fight against widespread diseases such as cardiovascular dis-
eases or diabetes mellitus) in order to gain a better understanding of the re-
spective causes and possible health consequences.
112
Anonymization makes 
such data worthless for research purposes by separating the data from the 
person, or at least reduces its value.
113
Anonymization or pseudonymization is also of limited use in the con-
text of personalized medicine. Medicine is shifting towards a more personal 
approach, tailoring the treatment to the individual condition and needs of the 
patient, instead of simply using generalized diagnostic and treatment meth-
ods.
114
In this regard, the volume of collected data, the new and repeated 
linking of data sets,
115
and the amount of detail is crucial.
116
Both are sub-
stantially harder to execute or not possible at all when data is anonymized.
117
110. Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 
SCIENCE 321, 321 (2013).
111. Adam Tanner, Harvard Professor Re-Identifies Anonymous Volunteers In DNA 
Study, FORBES (February 4, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013
/04/25/harvard-professor-re-identifies-anonymous-volunteers-in-dna-study/#4c4fc70892c9.
112. See Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon & Alison Knight, Anonymous Data v. Personal Data -
False Debate: An EU Perspective on Anonymization, Pseudonymization and Personal Data,
34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 284, 284 (2016) (noting that “the value or knowledge that can be gained 
from analyzing datasets (particularly using automatic algorithmic software) is maximized by 
virtue of finding patterns, basically linking relationships between data points.”).
113. See Mostert et al., supra note 94; Adrian Thorogood et al., An Implementation 
Framework for the Feedback of Individual Research Results and Incidental Findings in Re-
search, 15 BMC MED. ETHICS 1 (2014), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/88;
see also Ohm, supra note 105, at 1704 (noting that “data can be either useful or perfectly 
anonymous but never both”).
114. See Jacob S. Sherkow & Jorge L. Contreras, Intellectual Property, Surrogate Li-
censing, and Precision Medicine, 7 IP THEORY 1 (2018).
115. Brent D. Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Big Data: Current and Fore-
seeable Issues in Biomedical Contexts, 22 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS, 303, 314 (2015) (not-
ing that “big data is intended by design to reveal unforeseen connections between data 
points”).
116. In 2017, John Bell, Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford University, wrote in 
the U.K. government’s life sciences industrial strategy: “One of the most important resources 
held by the UK health system is the data generated by the 65 million people within it.” JOHN 
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Patients can also be harmed by anonymization. If the data on which re-
search results are based can no longer be connected to a specific person, this 
person can neither authorize later research projects that are in her own inter-
est, nor be informed about new insights that may affect her and that some-
times require urgent clinical action (e.g., discoveries regarding a previously 
unknown and now treatable health condition in an unidentifiable study par-
ticipant).
118
The patient has an elementary interest in such direct participa-
tion in the information gained.
119
In addition, knowledge gained retrospec-
tively, which potentially influences the risk or the individual course of a 
disease, can no longer be retransmitted, causing an ethical dilemma.
The downsides of anonymization apply, to a lesser extent, to pseudon-
ymization as it uses similar techniques and the goal is to at least somewhat 
loosen the connection between data and data subject. Pseudonymization 
should be considered as a data security measure but does not completely 
avoid restrictions under data protection or data privacy law. It also creates 
risks of its own, including errors in re-identifying patients by numbers on 
lab reports.
2. Consent
Where healthcare providers and researchers seek consent from patients, 
they pay respect to patient self-determination and autonomy but face practi-
cal implementation problems. Issues concerning individual consent have 
historically been primarily relevant with respect to medical research and 
clinical trials, while in the field of treatment, healthcare providers did not 
need to obtain consent from patients with respect to the limited data pro-
cessing that was necessary for treatment. But now, after significant medical 
advances, healthcare providers and patients face additional treatment and 
preventive maintenance options that require significantly more data pro-
cessing and increased concerns relating to the necessity and sufficiency of 
patient consent. This has caused a shift in the discussion towards everyday 
medical treatment and care.
The development and use of personalized medicine is based on and 
benefits from the processing and exchange of large amounts of health da-
BELL, LIFE SCIENCES: INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 56 (2017), www.gov.uk/government
/publications/life-sciences-industrial-strategy.
117. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016).
118. G. Owen Schaefer & Julian Savulescu, The Right to Know: A Revised Standard for 
Reporting Incidental Findings, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP, 22, 22 (2018).
119. Id.; see also Effy Vayena & Alessandro Blasimme, Biomedical Big Data: New 
Models of Control Over Access, Use and Governance, 14 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 501 (2017).
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ta.
120
This relates to a wide range of applications and ranges from data pro-
cessing for the purpose of self-optimization (monitoring of fitness data by 
the patient) or the supervision of an initiated medical treatment (monitoring 
of medication administered by the doctor) to a continuous preventative 
analysis of health data (e.g., observation of vital data to enable early inter-
vention). In the case of chronic diseases, these can be combined with data 
on the patient’s lifestyle, following the idea of an automated diagnosis or 
even therapy recommendations by artificial intelligence in the future.
Physicians face the problem of obtaining the necessary consent of the 
data subject, due to the unpredictability and complexity of such ambitious 
projects. Besides other challenges,
121
they need to decide how extensive and 
broad the consent should be. They have the option to use declarations of 
consent that are broadly formulated with regard to objectives and possible 
uses. These broad types of consent assign the supervision of later renewed 
or further use of the data to certain bodies, such as in the form of institution-
al review boards (United States) or research ethics committees (Europe)
122
in 
medical research. Informing the patients about the objectives and methods 
of data processing in a detailed way before they grant consent would be an-
other option.
If organizations use open-ended privacy notices and excessively broad 
scope definitions in consent declaration forms, trying to anticipate potential 
future data uses, they undermine the validity of the resulting consents. Con-
sent according to data protection regulations has to be a voluntary, unequiv-
ocally expressed declaration stating specific purposes. If consent is too 
broad, it may not meet legal standards. For example, Articles 4(11), 6(1)(a), 
and 7 of the GDPR set high standards in this regard and in principle demand 
consent to be narrow and specific even though Recital 33 of the GDPR 
acknowledges that this might not be possible in medical research and a 
broader form of consent may be required, creating uncertainty in practice.
123
Even if an organization provides excessive detail in privacy notices, this 
by no means guarantees that the consenting patient is truly informed. Pa-
tients who are overwhelmed with details they cannot understand due to a 
lack of medical or genetic expertise may not even try to understand any of
120. Akram Alyass et al., From Big Data Analysis to Personalized Medicine For All: 
Challenges and Opportunities, BMC MED. GENOMICS (June 27, 2015),
https://bmcmedgenomics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12920-015-0108-y.
121. Christine Grady describes cultural differences as an example of the potential issues 
arising from obtaining consent in the modern age of medicine. She refers to the different ways 
of making a decision, alone or within a family or community, and distinct moral values as rea-
sons for potential misunderstandings. See Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challeng-
es of Informed Consent, 372 N. ENG. J. MED.855 (2015).
122. Jane Kaye, The Tension Between Data Sharing and the Protection of Privacy in 
Genomics Research, 13 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 415, 422 (2012).
123. David Townend, Conclusion: Harmonization in Genomic and Health Data Sharing
for Research: An Impossible Dream?, 137 HUM. GENETICS 657, 661 (2018).
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the details in the privacy notice and thus end up less informed than they 
could have been based on a shorter, broader notice.
124
Moreover, if an organization tries to create very specific scope defini-
tions in consent declaration forms, this may be counter-productive in the 
treatment context. Many treatments consist of various separate constituent 
parts, and could thus each require a separate, specific consent. Patients, who 
usually assume every diagnostic measure is part of the treatment as a whole 
and will therefore be carried out in their best interest, may become con-
cerned or irritated if they are repeatedly prompted with consent requests and 
they may lose trust in the treating physician.
The language barrier is another challenge that commonly arises in the 
medical field.
125
A growing number of patients are not native speakers or do 
not speak the language of the country in which they receive treatment.
126
Al-
so, few doctors are specifically trained to obtain informed consent from pa-
tients and usually do not have the time to inform them sufficiently about all 
the details of their treatment and the exact ways their data will be used.
127
In 
reality, the patient is usually handed a standardized consent form that de-
scribes the upcoming procedure and possible risks and asked to sign it. This 
might be done by a medical student or a nurse and it is not guaranteed that a 
doctor will be present for a patient to ask any specific questions they may 
have.
128
Whether consent is an absolute must for information self-determination 
has long been questioned. The GDPR, for example, provides many excep-
tions to consent requirements
129
and the CCPA requires consent only from 
minors and parents of children.
130
In the treatment context in particular, it often seems doubtful whether 
patients declare consent exercising free will.
131
In some situations, there 
124. See Matthew E. Falagas et al., Informed Consent: How Much and What do Patients 
Understand?, 198 AM. J. SURGERY 420, 421 (2009).
125. For an early perspective on the situation in the United States, See Glenn Flores, 
Language Barriers to Health Care in the United States, 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 229, 230 (2006).
126. Renata F. I. Meuter et al., Overcoming Language Barriers in Healthcare: A Proto-
col for Investigating Safe and Effective Communication when Patients or Clinicians Use a
Second Language, 15 BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 371 (2015); Allison Squires, Strategies for 
Overcoming Language Barriers in Healthcare, 49 NURSING MGMT. 20, 21 (2018).
127. Grady, supra note 121, at 857.
128. See Michael Billig, Medizinstudenten im PJ - Das hätte auch schiefgehen 
können, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2019), http://www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/uni
/medizinstudenten-im-pj-das-haette-auch-schiefgehen-koennen-a-914791.html.
129. Winfried Veil gives a good overview over the exceptions regulated in the GDP. See
Winfried Veil, Public Interest in the GPDR 2 (Feb. 5, 2019, 6:55PM), https://.flickr.com
/photos/winfried-veil/39501609474/in/dateposted-public.
130. California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(c) (West 2020).
131. Ulrich M. Gassner accurately describes “take it or leave it” situations as an example 
of consent that might not be based on free will entirely. See Ulrich M. Gassner, Informed 
Consent und Digital Health, in BIG DATA UND E-HEALTH 35 (2017).
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might not be an option other than to agree to someone using the data.
132
For 
example, a patient will regularly have to share personal information 
throughout treatments, for example, on the development of pain, symptoms, 
or side effects. Without information sharing, the treatment is not effective or 
possible. Many patients have no actual choices whether to give consent.
133
Even where choices exist in principle, the doctor is in a stronger position 
because of her superior knowledge, so the patient will usually respect her 
authority and follow a request for consent.
134
Even if one assumes a patient can freely give informed consent, it is de-
batable whether individual consent is the best basis for determining whether 
data should or should not be used. By primarily focusing on the seemingly 
compulsory need for consent whenever data is collected, we lose sight of 
the fact that information is constantly exchanged as part of our everyday life 
and we do rely on it being collected and processed.
135
No one owns data,
136
and most people accept a “tension between autonomy and solidarity” with 
respect to data collection and usage.
137
According to many data protection laws, organizations have to obtain 
consent if they want to use data for different purposes than those for which 
they originally collected the data. The GDPR prescribes in Article 5(1) that 
“personal data shall be . . . collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a matter that is incompatible with 
those initial purposes” provided that “scientific . . . or historical research . . .
or statistical purposes shall not be considered to be incompatible with the 
initial purposes.”
138
This exception is helpful for scientific, statistical, and 
historic research, but does not expressly extend to medical research or prod-
uct development. Also organizations that try to adhere to the purpose limita-
tion principle often impose limits on themselves in privacy policies when 
they define their original data collection objectives. Such self-imposed pur-
pose limitations often exceed what is expressly required by law. Moreover, 
researchers and developers are not exempt from the requirement of data 
minimization.
139
132. Winfried Veil lists applying for a loan as an example. See Winfried Veil, The Em-
peror’s New Clothes - On the Structural Shortcomings of Both the Old and the New Data Pro-
tection Law, 10 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 686-696 (2018).
133. Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Fu-
ture, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505, 1506, (2019).
134. Robert Harvey, “Informing Consent”: Challenging Perceptions within Medical 
Law. Can We Ever Truly “Consent” Under the Present “Law”? (2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2813239).
135. See generally Veil, supra note 132, at 686.
136. See generally Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2018).
137. Townend, supra note 123, at 662.
138. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of May 25, 2018 (General Data Protection Regulation) 
art. 5(1) (EU).
139. See id. art. 89.
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The vague and somewhat contradictory wording of the GDPR
140
creates 
uncertainty and doubt and makes it difficult for organizations to determine 
how they can comply.
141
To be on the safe side, many organizations consider 
seeking consent from the data subject before they use existing data for new 
purposes. But, in many cases, particularly relating to pseudonymized data, 
the data subject or the surviving relatives are difficult to find or identify. 
Even in the case of living data subjects whose contact details are known, 
there is a risk of “fatigue” and a corresponding lack of willingness to re-
spond.
142
Obtaining consent might sometimes be problematic in the first place, 
but as long as the respective treatment is still needed or ongoing, there is 
usually a better chance that the patient will cooperate in additional studies or 
research of any kind. Once a patient has “left the system,” it is more diffi-
cult to reach and convince a person to read a lengthy privacy notice and de-
clare consent.
143
A former patient may not want to be reminded of a cured or 
chronic disease and prior treatment. Patients who were cured based on in-
formation of prior patients may be disinclined to “give back” and allow their 
information to be used for further studies.
144
C. Medical Confidentiality
In addition to data protection regulations, physicians are also obligated 
to maintain medical confidentiality. Patients expect confidentiality as a 
“core value of medicine,”
145
which is codified in rules of conduct of the 
medical profession.
146
According to the Hippocratic oath
147
and the more 
140. At what point is research no longer compatible with the initial purpose? How can 
data minimization and the large amount of information needed for research be reconciled?
141. See generally Townend, supra note 123.
142. See Thomas Ploug & Søren Holm, Meta Consent: A Flexible and Autonomous Way 
of Obtaining Informed Consent for Secondary Research, 350 BMJ 1 (2015).
143. See Mostert et al., supra note 94, at 957.
144. See generally Kaye, supra note 122 (discussing concerns relating to patient con-
sent).
145. Thomas H. McCoy & Michael C. Hughes, Preserving Patient Confidentiality as 
Data Grow: Implications of the Ability to Reidentify Physical Activity Data, JAMA NETWORK 
OPEN (Dec. 21, 2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle
/2719121.
146. See, e.g., Berufsordnung der Landesärztekammer, LANDESÄRZTEKAMMER (Mar. 
26, 2019), https://www.laekh.de/images/Aerzte/Rund_ums_Recht/Rechtsquellen
/berufsordnung.pdf.
147. See The Hippocratic Oath and Others, MCMASTER UNI., 
https://hslmcmaster.libguides.com/c.php?g=306726&p=2044095 (last updated Apr. 26, 2019) 
(“What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in 
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, 
holding such things shameful to be spoken about.”).
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modern Declaration of Geneva,
148
physicians are obligated to maintain se-
crecy with regard to knowledge acquired in the course of providing 
healthcare. Moreover, physicians are prohibited by criminal law from re-
leasing personal data in violation of medical profession regulations.
149
These regulations have two purposes. One, like data protection regula-
tions, medical confidentiality regulations seek to protect the interest of the 
individual in the confidentiality of certain (health-relevant) facts as an ex-
pression of the right to informational self-determination. Two, medical con-
fidentiality is necessary as a basis for general trust in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship in order to protect the functioning of the health system. For 
example, if patients do not trust doctors, they may not seek treatment for 
contagious diseases and expose themselves and others to unnecessary risks. 
Also, patients who do not trust their doctor may withhold information or lie 
about lifestyle habits, for example, downplaying alcohol consumption, 
denying tobacco use, or exaggerating daily exercise. Based on such misin-
formation, physicians can be less effective in treating the individual patient 
and drawing conclusions for general healthcare and lifestyle recommenda-
tions.
III. RISKS OF DATA PROCESSING FOR PATIENTS,
RESEARCHERS, AND DOCTORS
Risks of data processing have been well researched: Individuals need 
protection from psychological, economic, and other privacy harms that 
states, businesses, criminals, and others cause. For example, these harms 
can be caused by identity theft; blackmail; bullying; stalking; revelation of 
secret location or identities of spies, domestic abuse victims, or persons in 
witness protection programs; stigmatization based on addictions, diseases, 
political opinions, religion, race, or sexual preferences; computer hacking; 
irritating direct marketing methods; unfair business practices based on sur-
reptitious data collection; and discrimination by employers, banks, and in-
surance companies based on information about pre-existing health condi-
tions.
150
The main reason for the increasingly extensive data processing 
148. See WMA Declaration of Geneva, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-geneva (last updated Oct. 2018) (“I
will respect the secrets that are confided in me, even after the patient has died”).
149. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] § 203(1) (2019) (Ger.).
150. Danielle Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2019); see also Ryan 
Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361 (2018); Amit Datta et al., Au-
tomated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings, PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. 92, 92
(2015); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1809 (2015); Mikella Hur-
ley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 151 
(2016); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process For Auto-
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2014); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Priva-
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regulation in the field of healthcare and medical research is the high sensi-
tivity of the data. An individual’s health is one of the most private aspects of 
life and the corresponding information is accordingly vulnerable. The col-
lection, use, and sharing of health data creates many risks for patients, re-
searchers, and physicians. In the past, collected health data could be de-
identified in a staged order to protect those affected so that their identity 
was not revealed in the event of unauthorized access. This possibility is sub-
ject to increasing uncertainty due to technical developments.
151
The possible exposure of such data can lead to a severe level of stigma-
tization, especially in the case of infectious diseases such as HIV
152
or men-
tal health conditions such as depression or schizophrenia.
153
Patients may 
experience embarrassment, shame, and even social exclusion should infor-
mation of this nature become public. In contrast to leaked credit card details 
or a hacked online e-commerce account, the harm resulting from disclosures 
that a person suffers from a certain disease cannot be undone by changing a 
password or blocking access to a bank account. Instead, the perceived stig-
matization is likely to affect the quality of life of the affected and can also 
cause additional health conditions, such as a variety of psychosomatic 
symptoms.
154
Inadvertent disclosures are not uncommon, yet they are still potentially 
very harmful.
155
In 2001, a manufacturer of a well-known anti-depression 
drug ran an email notification service for patients to remind them to take 
and reorder the drug. In an email to all subscribers, a company employee 
accidentally inserted the email addresses of all subscribers in the visible 
“to” field (as opposed to the suppressed “bcc” field), thus introducing all 
subscribers to each other and revealing their subscription.
156
The FTC 
launched a complaint and compelled the company to introduce additional 
security protocols for sensitive data.
157
In addition to fears regarding data security risks, patients are also con-
cerned that the availability and disclosure of their health information creates 
cy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: 
A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2018);
151. See supra Part II(2)(a).
152. Only recently, the names, addresses, and HIV status of 14,200 people in Singapore 
were leaked. Fury at HIV Data Leak in Conservative Singapore, MED. EXPRESS (FEB. 10,
2019), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2019-02-fury-hiv-leak-singapore.html.
153. Even diseases like cancer that are necessarily associated with a certain (negative) 
public perception, can cause the feeling of being stigmatized. See J. Ernst et al., Perceived 
Stigmatization and Its Impact on Quality of Life - Results from a Large Register-Based Study
Including Breast, Colon, Prostate and Lung Cancer Patients, 17 BMC CANCER 741 (2017).
154. Michael Koller et al., Symptom Reporting in Cancer Patients: The Role of Negative 
Affect and Experienced Social Stigma, 77 CANCER 983, 994 (1996).
155. See, e.g., Gavin Yamey, Eli Lilly Violates Patients’ Privacy, 323 BMJ 65 (2001).
156. Complaint, Eli Lilly & Co., C-4047, at ¶ 6 (Fed. Trade Comm’n May 8, 2002).
157. Decision and Order, Eli Lilly & Co., C-4047, § II (Fed. Trade Comm’n May 8, 
2002).
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discrimination risks.
158
On the basis of collected health data, insurance com-
panies could burden individual customers with higher rates for health, life, 
or disability insurance or not accept them at all.
159
Employers could use 
health information as an opportunity to assess the performance of their em-
ployees or to refrain from hiring, retaining, or promoting job candidates. 
Banks could grant loans only to the healthy or vary the interest depending 
on the health record of a customer as one without serious diseases is more 
likely to work longer and therefore to be able to meet his or her contractual 
obligations. The same applies to housing where a healthy tenant could be 
seen as the more reliable one. Health information might become an even 
more important economic factor if it is widely available to businesses.
Another phenomenon is that some individuals prefer not to be confront-
ed with unwanted knowledge about their own state of health by uncovering 
genetic risks or existing illnesses that can turn their life plans upside 
down.
160
While the “transparent patient” is desirable from a diagnostic point 
of view, some could appreciate the freedom of not knowing every detail 
about their health situation. The collection of an extensive amount of data 
increases the chance of a random discovery of certain predispositions or an 
actual illness. Especially when there is no therapeutic consequence, the ben-
efit is at least doubtful and might be outweighed by the potential harm. An 
increasing number of companies provide basic genetic research to consum-
ers and give easy access to DNA tests. Information that used to be difficult 
to obtain is suddenly widely available and also concerns family members of 
the individual who chooses to obtain or publish her own DNA information. 
Therefore, there is an increasing possibility of unintentionally discovering 
details about one’s genetic predisposition for diseases or regarding family 
ties, e.g., being adopted or having a different father than expected.
161
The need to store health information for data processing also makes this 
data vulnerable to criminal activity. Unauthorized persons can gain access 
to data stored by health insurance companies, doctors, or research institu-
tions and thus “capture” these data and use them to the disadvantage of the 
data subject. Patients could be blackmailed with the knowledge of a stigma-
tized disease.
162
Also, knowledge of health information in the hands of unau-
158. Berkman et al., supra note 109, at 59; see Ribhi Hazin et al., Ethical, Legal, and
Social Implications of Incorporating Genomic Information into Electronic Health Records, 15 
GENETICS IN MED. 810, 810-15 (2013).
159. Hazin et al., supra note 158, at 814.
160. Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using Archived
DNA, 36 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 286 (2008).
161. Elle Hunt, Your Father’s Not Your Father, GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/sep/18/your-fathers-not-your-father-when-
dna-tests-reveal-more-than-you-bargained-for.
162. Emily Yahr, Charlie Sheen Says He’s HIV-Positive, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/11/17/charlie-sheen-
i-am-in-fact-hiv-positive.
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thorized persons can be the basis for identity theft or fraudulent offers such 
as alleged miracle cures or simply counterfeit drugs that try to capitalize on 
the increased vulnerability of a seriously ill person.
More than just patients face risks associated with processing of data. 
Treating physicians can suffer reputational damage from public access to 
“bad” statistics as well as researchers from “false” research results. For ex-
ample, the provision of data on evaluation portals on the Internet or the sta-
tistical processing of treatment information, detached from the treatment 
context, can lead to an incorrect public perception.
163
This is obvious in the 
case of intended damage to reputation, but it is also conceivable in the re-
production of information that is accurate at the data level. For example, a 
high mortality rate among a physician’s patients could be read as an indica-
tion of an accumulation of treatment errors, but in reality be caused by a 
specialization or an above average willingness to accept difficult cases of 
severe diseases associated with increased mortality.
164
Such “false” trans-
parency can cause significant negative consequences for the people in-
volved. Even today, it leads to some institutions rejecting “high-risk pa-
tients” because they “endanger the statistics.”
165
This puts patients at a con-
concrete risk.
The same is true for doctors who are evaluated by their patients, be it 
online or via internal surveys carried out by a hospital. This can lead to 
medical treatments being influenced by the patient’s wishes and demands, 
reasonable or not, only to improve evaluation scores. Some physicians 
might even consider influencing the ratings by making patients sign waivers 
to prevent them from giving unfavorable reviews and thereby counteract the 
whole idea of evaluation.
166
IV. PROTECTING TRUST AND HEALTH DATA
A patient regularly has to share sensitive information about her state of 
health and lifestyle during a medical treatment or in the context of medical 
research.
167
The patient’s or study participant’s willingness to accept the 
risks inherent in the processing of health data is crucial to provide promising 
163. Jennwood Chen et al. describe the discrepancy between reviews given on online 
platforms and the actual satisfaction of the patient. See Jennwood Chen et al., Online Physi-
cian Review Websites Poorly Correlate to a Validated Metric of Patient Satisfaction, 227 J.
SURGICAL RES. 1, 4-5 (2018).
164. See Richard Lilford & Peter Pronovost, Using Hospital Mortality Rates to Judge 
Hospital Performance: A Bad Idea That Just Won’t Go Away, 340 BMJ 955-57 (2010).
165. See id.
166. Julie B. Samora et al., Physician-Rating Web Sites: Ethical Implications, 41 J.
HAND SURGERY AM. 104, 104 (2016).
167. Angeliki Kerasidou, Trust Me, I’m a Researcher!: The Role of Trust in Biomedical 
Research, 20 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHILOS. 43-50 (2017).
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treatment and carry out successful research.
168
However, it also requires trust 
in the actors of the health system, such as doctors, hospitals, health insur-
ance funds, and research institutions.
169
Protecting this trust is a common 
fundamental objective of the rules of data protection law and the rules of 
patient confidentiality.
The patient relies on the confidentiality, security, and accuracy of the 
information disclosed when health data is processed. However, the concept 
of trust is not one-sided. The physician also trusts in the accuracy of the data 
and its secure use, particularly in the context of data processing for research 
projects that often involve considerable development efforts.
170
Patients develop two kinds of trust: trust with regard to certain actions 
(“act-trustworthiness”) and trust with regard to certain persons (“character-
trustworthiness”).
171
In the first case, the patient trusts that a particular ac-
tion to be taken suits the interests of the patient and the actor. Trust exists as 
long as the interests of the person concerned and the person acting are per-
ceived to be aligned. In the second case, the patient trusts an individual phy-
sician, researcher, or organization because of an impression or reputation of 
appropriate attitude and accountability.
This distinction may explain the different perception of trust in cases of 
medical treatment (the patient seeks treatment from a resident physician on 
the basis of pain or another symptom) on the one hand and on the other 
hand medical research (a cancer patient participates in a clinical trial to de-
velop a new drug). In the interaction with the treating physician, the patient 
can usually assess the extent of and reason for collecting his data. This rea-
son is obvious to the patient as she is the one suffering from a certain condi-
tion and therefore seeks help in the form of a sufficient treatment. Knowing 
the existing professional ethical obligation to act in the interest of the patient 
and the professional and legal obligation to maintain confidentiality, the pa-
168. At least from the (subjective) perspective of the patient, the treatment outcome is 
better when the level of trust is higher. “Across diverse clinical settings, patients reported to 
be more satisfied with treatment, to show more beneficial health behaviours, less symptoms 
and higher quality of life when they had higher trust in their health care professional.” Johan-
na Birkhäuer et al., Trust in the Health Care Professional and Health Outcome: A Meta-
Analysis, 12 PLOS ONE 1 (2017).
169. Anna C. Mastroianni states, “Maintaining public trust is absolutely crucial to the 
research enterprise. Without trust, volunteers will be impossible to recruit, and the public will 
be unwilling to fund research.” Anna C. Mastroianni, Sustaining Public Trust: Falling Short 
in the Protection of Human Research Participants, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8, 8 (2008).
170. Susan Dorr Goold sees trust as “essential to both physician and patient.” Susan 
Dorr Goold, Trust, Distrust and Trustworthiness: Lessons from the Field, 17 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 79, 79 (2002).
171. J. Patrick Woolley, Trust and Justice in Big Data Analytics: Bringing the Philo-
sophical Literature on Trust to Bear on the Ethics of Consent, 32 PHILOS. & TECH. 111
(2017).
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tient can assume that the data will be used in his or her own interest.
172
Trust 
arises both in the action itself and in the person acting.
The situation is different for the patient in a clinical study. Due to a lack 
of insight and expertise, it is not possible for the patient to be aware of the 
actions carried out in the context of data processing. Also, the cause of the 
data collection and its processing is not as present and tangible as it might 
be in the case of the treatment of an actual disease. This is further intensi-
fied through complex and international “big data” applications.
173
The pa-
tient cannot determine whether the mutual interests of all parties do coincide 
without insight into the individual actions. Trust in data processing can 
therefore only arise with regard to the acting person.
174
Lacking this trust, 
the patient may get the impression that, for example, due to economic moti-
vation, data processing is not carried out in the patient’s interest or is ne-
glected contrary to the patient’s interests. This poses a severe threat to a 
study and its successful outcome,
175
as individuals are less likely to partici-
pate. If, in the case of commercial research, the patient gets the impression 
that her own data is being processed for the financial benefit of another, a 
feeling of exploitation may arise. These considerations and the establish-
ment of trust in the data processing authority have to be taken into account 
when solutions are being developed. After all, the issue of trust in the con-
text of a research project is not only relevant to the patient. Moreover, the 
researching physician usually has no access to the complete data set and 
must trust in a correct process of data processing. He lacks the ability to 
control several risks of the research project. Therefore, the physician has to 
trust in the functioning of individual institutions (such as security commit-
tees and data protection officers) and the independence of their actions from 
the sponsor’s economic interests.
Overall, it is important to seek the benefits of efficient and comprehen-
sive data processing without undermining patient confidence, be it within 
the personal interaction between patient and doctor or during a medical 
study. Extensive data protection laws can be helpful in that regard, but there 
is no guarantee they will actually help to build the patient’s trust.
176
On the 
contrary, overly detailed privacy notices and repeated requests for specific 
consent can even increase levels of distrust. Instead of increasing the fre-
quency of consent requests and the detail in privacy notices, the focus 
should be put on ensuring the trustworthiness of doctors and research insti-
172. Kerasidou, supra note 167, at 48.
173. Woolley, supra note 171, at 112.
174. Angeliki Kerasidou argues that the researcher has to show “good will” similar to 
that of the treating physician. Kerasidou, supra note 167, at 44.
175. Mastroianni, supra note 169, at 8.
176. Some even see regulations and sanctions as signs of distrust. See Onora O’Neill, 
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 95 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 423 (2002).
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tutions and communicating the purpose and value of a treatment or study in 
a way that patients and study participants can relate to.
177
V. RISKS OF DATA REGULATION AND PRIVACY LAWS FOR 
INDIVIDUAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Data processing can create risks for privacy and trust, as discussed in 
the preceding Sections III and IV of this Article. Not processing data also 
creates risks. Restricting the collection, sharing, and other processing of 
personal data adversely affects the future of medicine and individual health. 
Such risks resulting from data protection regulations and data privacy laws 
are often downplayed or overshadowed by concerns for privacy in the pub-
lic debate regarding privacy laws, but risks resulting from restricting data 
processing also exist and shall be further illustrated in this section.
A. Slowing Down Medical and Scientific Progress
The human body is extraordinary in terms of its complexity.
178
Count-
less processes take place simultaneously and interact regularly in various 
ways. Modern medicine has succeeded in understanding many of these pro-
cesses and has adapted its therapies accordingly. However, without collect-
ing and processing the requisite information, this theoretical knowledge is 
only of limited use and no further progress is achievable.
Therefore, today’s medicine needs more data for treatment, prevention, 
and medical research. With more data, treatments can become more effec-
tive while unnecessary—or even counterproductive—treatments can be 
avoided.
179
Physicians can get access to an extended pool of known cases 
via improved data exchange that can be used to evaluate and compare the 
situation of the patient. Patients also benefit from the use of data processing: 
for instance, X-ray images, which are stored in an electronic health record 
and can thus be passed on from doctor to doctor without great effort, are al-
ready available when the patient sees another doctor and do not have to be 
re-created. Treating physicians get a better impression of the current situa-
tion and can better tailor their treatment to the individual patient when they 
have access to a patient’s entire medical history.
180
177. Kerasidou, supra note 167, at 49.
178. Stephen Naylor & Jake Y Chen, Unraveling Human Complexity and Disease with 
Systems Biology and Personalized Medicine, 7 PERSONALIZED MED. 275 (2010).
179. Nicholas J. Schork points out that every day, a significant amount of people take
medication that does not benefit them. See Nicholas J. Schork, Comment, Time for One-
Person Trials, 520 NATURE 609 (2015).
180. Nir Menachemi and Taleah H. Collum name several benefits of electronic health 
records, e.g., improved legal and regulatory compliance, improved ability to conduct research 
and increased job satisfaction among physicians. See Nir Menachemi & Taleah H. Collum,
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Two essential advantages of extensive data processing are comprehen-
siveness and efficiency. Patient information is essential when treating a dis-
ease. Even in the case of specific inquiries, a physician cannot assume that a 
new patient reliably transmits all the necessary details about personal habits, 
symptoms, prior treatments, and test results. Often, facts seen as irrelevant 
are concealed (e.g., drinking or eating habits), exaggerated (e.g., exercise 
habits), or simply forgotten, even though they are decisive for the correct 
diagnosis or therapy. For example, knowledge of a low hemoglobin level 
itself is not necessarily a cause for concern. It could be detected during a 
routine check-up and would probably not lead to further diagnostic 
measures, at least not instantly. However, combined with the fact that the 
patient has been suffering from diarrhea for several weeks, it makes a 
coloscopy almost indispensable to eliminate more serious diseases as the 
possible origin of the symptoms. To draw that conclusion, the treating doc-
tor has to be fully informed, which is all but self-evident in a time of in-
creasing specialization. The patient might only focus on specific symptoms 
based on the special qualification of the respective physician. As a result, a 
possible connection might be missed.
In addition, time is of extraordinary importance in medicine. As a gen-
eral rule, the sooner a treatment can be initiated, the better. For example, 
every tissue in the human body has a certain tolerance for oxygen depriva-
tion. The brain is most sensitive in that regard, a fact that is vividly ex-
pressed by the common medical phrase “time is brain.”
181
In the case of a 
stroke every second saved by providing easy access to the complete medical 
history of the patient could lessen the damage or even save her life.
These advantages have been recognized, but only acted upon in a few 
countries to date. A good example is the SCAAR registry, which includes 
all Swedish patients with a coronary intervention.
182
There is no such regis-
try in Germany, for example, which might have something to do with the 
increased sensitivity and skepticism regarding automated data processing 
and the more restrictive interpretation and application of data protection 
laws. Such hesitation, while somewhat understandable in view of the al-
ready described dangers of processing health data and that data’s particular-
ly sensitive character, stops people from benefitting from the undeniable 
opportunities.
“Big data” applications can combine and link previously unrelated data 
sets. This is especially important because of the already-mentioned com-
plexity of the human organism. Traditional research has focused on disease 
Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic Health Record Systems, 4 RISK MGMT. &
HEALTHCARE POL’Y 47, 47, 50 (2011)
181. Jeffrey L. Saver, Time Is Brain, 37 STROKE 263 (2006).
182. Bo Lagerqvist, et al., Long-Term Outcomes with Drug-Eluting Stents Versus Bare-
Metal Stents in Sweden, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 1009 (2007).
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as a result of one particular physiological change, such as the sudden ap-
pearance of particular symptoms or injuries.
183
The physical and mental 
health of a person, however, is influenced by a variety of factors. Each fac-
tor alone can lead to a certain outcome.
184
Once combined with other factors, 
the effect could be a completely different one. These interactions and corre-
spondences cannot be validated in current clinical trials as they usually fo-
cus on the influence of one or two specific variables.
185
Therefore, providing 
a higher quantity and quality of health data and possibly using computer al-
gorithms to connect and analyze different data sets increases the chances of 
success of such research and can uncover previously unknown correlations 
and thus contribute to a better understanding of the causes of diseases and 
the chances of treatment.
186
Rare but relevant side effects of drugs or thera-
pies can also be detected more quickly and the collection of data on medical 
treatments makes treatment processes more transparent for the benefit of the 
patients. Errors can be detected more easily or avoided altogether.
187
The decoding of the human genome is another factor of enormous im-
portance for the further development of medicine. Genomic data offers a 
multitude of opportunities for new diagnostics and treatments.
188
Ever since 
the discovery of the DNA molecule in 1953, the influence of genetics on 
medicine has been constantly growing.
189
For example, it became a tool in 
the fight for equality and social justice when the Black Panther Party started 
to organize testing for sickle cell anemia, an inherited blood disorder that is 




With regard to per-
sonalized medicine in particular, there is an opportunity to develop individ-
ual treatment concepts that not only focus on disease as such, but also take 
into account the patient and all environmental and personal factors affecting 
183. See Jeffrey. J. Borckardt et al., Clinical Practice as Natural Laboratory for Psycho-
therapy Research: A Guide to Case-Based Time-Series Analysis, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 77
(2008).
184. Especially on the genetic level, there are numerous variations and seemingly end-
less possible outcomes. A disease can be the result of an anomaly within one or several genes. 
Even the specific position of the deviation is important. See Soumita Podder & Tapash C. 
Ghosh, Exploring the Differences in Evolutionary Rates Between Monogenic and Polygenic 
Disease Genes in Human, 27 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 934 (2010).
185. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421
(2015).
186. See Price, supra note 117, at 1401.
187. For a summary of the benefits of using algorithms in the field of medicine, see id.
188. B. M. Knoppers & Yann Joly, Introduction: The Why and Whither of Genomic Da-
ta Sharing, 137 HUM. GENETICS 569 (2018).
189. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Is-
sues, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1227 (2014).
190. Sickle Cell Trait, AM. SOC’Y HEMATOLOGY (Feb. 20, 2019, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.hematology.org/Patients/Anemia/Sickle-Cell-Trait.aspx.
191. Mary T. Bassett, Beyond Berets: The Black Panthers as Health Activists, 106 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1741, 1741-42 (2016).
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her. A good example for optimizing a treatment based on genetic infor-
mation is the treatment of breast cancer with Trastuzumab, a monoclonal 
antibody. Certain forms of breast cancer express a particular receptor, the 
so-called human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 or HER2, that is target-
ed by Trastuzumab.
192
Therefore, the drug only helps patients whose tumor 
expresses this receptor, but does that in a very specific and effective way.
193
A particular test can identify the receptor expression rate.
194
In this way, the 
knowledge about the genetic background of a disease helps researchers and 
doctors not only to get a better understanding of its pathophysiology but al-
so to find treatments that are more efficient and have fewer side effects, 
since healthy tissue is less likely to be affected by them. Patients can only 
fully benefit from these opportunities if laws and regulations do not hinder 
the collection, use, and exchange of information.
Even from an economic point of view, increased data collection and 
improved processing can be very useful. It can lead to a higher efficiency 
and therefore to cost savings in healthcare systems suffering from cost in-
creases worldwide.
195
That can lead to a direct benefit for the contributing 
patients and the public health insurers.
At the same time, primarily focusing on consent might have unexpected 
consequences. Health data already is a very valuable good. Further reducing 
the available amount could result in patients expecting some form of com-
pensation for the requested information, especially in the research context, 
thereby putting more financial pressure on the healthcare system. And it 
could cause hospitals or pharmaceutical companies to model their treatment 
based on whether consent for processing their data has been given by the 
patients or not.
Data protection law therefore carries the risk of hindering positive de-
velopments through the requirements of informed, voluntary, specific, and 
explicit consent. The general prohibition of automated processing of per-
sonal data, the need for data minimization, the obligation to delete data that 
are no longer acutely needed, and the resulting need for strict purpose limi-
tation in Europe further complicate the process by adding further hurdles to 
processing a reduced amount of data.
192. Gabriel N. Hortobagyi, Trastuzumab in the Treatment of Breast Cancer, 353 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1734 (2005).
193. See Edward H. Romond et al., Trastuzumab Plus Adjuvant Chemotherapy for Op-
erable HER2-Positive Breast Cancer, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 1673, 1674 (2005); see also Mar-
tine J. Piccart-Gebhart et al., Trastuzumab After Adjuvant Chemotherapy in HER2-Positive 
Breast Cancer, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 1659, 1660 (2005).
194. See Breast Cancer HER2 Status, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/breast-cancer/understanding-a-breast-cancer-diagnosis/breast-
cancer-her2-status.html#written_by.
195. Price, supra note 117, at 140 (referring to precision medicine as an opportunity to 
“potentially save billions in wasted or inappropriate medical care”).
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B. Prevention of Risk
The collection and processing of data is not only of significant im-
portance for the treatment of diseases, be it on a general level via research 
or as part of an actual therapeutic measure. It can also be used as a tool for 
risk prevention. Even now, big data applications are already used this way 
in the area of public health. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (“CDC”) is pursuing a strategy of improving data processing and 
combining data on drug-related deaths to contain and monitor the opioid ep-
idemic.
196
In addition, health authorities around the world use mobile phone 
data to map population flows in the wake of epidemics or natural disasters, 
thus anticipating the possible spread of diseases and using their own re-
sources for the greatest possible benefit.
197
At a more individual level, physicians are required by law to withhold 
information about an individual’s state of health, even if her medical condi-
tion could pose a threat to others. In 2015, a pilot flew a commercial aircraft 
with 150 passengers into a mountain in the French Alps, apparently inten-
tionally, with the intent to commit suicide and mass murder.
198
The pilot had 
previously received medical treatment from various doctors.
199
On the day 
of the crash, he had received a doctor’s prescription to be on sick leave be-
cause of psychological problems.
200
The pilot had kept these circumstances 
secret from his employer.
201
Due to data protection regulations and patient 
confidentiality, neither the airline nor the authorities had access to the pi-
lots’ health records.
202
According to § 34 of the German Criminal Code, 
treating doctors are allowed to report a specific health condition and thus to 
breach the duty of confidentiality in the event of an emergency situation. In 
this case, however, no reporting took place,
203
possibly due to the uncertain-
ty regarding the correct procedure to follow to ensure compliance with data 
protection and medical confidentiality laws. Also, in the case of an infec-
tious disease (e.g., an HIV infection), it is not easy for doctors to inform rel-
atives or public authorities if the patient decides to keep his or her disease 
secret and thereby endangers others.
196. Modernizing Drug Death Data, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/projects/improving-data-on-drug-overdose-
deaths.html.
197. See Matthew Wall, Ebola: Can Big Data Analytics Help Contain its Spread?, BBC
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-29617831.







203. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [German Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL I at 3322, 
amended June 19, 2019, BGBL I at 844, § 34 (Ger.).
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The protection of a patient’s right not to know about health risks in his 
or her own genetic predisposition has also been a subject of controversy. 
This right becomes relevant, for example, if the genetic risk of a disease or 
other health risks are discovered in the course of a clinical study but the dis-
covery is not further processed or shared in a helpful way even though this 
could have easily been achieved since the information was already collect-
ed. This might be another limitation to the collection of relevant infor-
mation.
204
If, however, data protection is understood as a self-determined handling 
of data related to the respective individual itself, it is equally reasonable to 
assume that the patient has a “right to know.”
205
Withholding health infor-
mation may equal withholding medically indicated treatment or preventive 
medicine options. The corresponding decision, like the decision on the ini-
tial collection of information, is a form of handling personal data, which is 
the responsibility of the individual. In such constellations, the attending 
physician is also placed in a position of conflict. The physician has to re-
spect the patient’s right not to know but must also act professionally and 
ethically for the benefit of the patient.
In these cases, a solution based solely on the individual’s consent fo-
cuses too much on individual privacy and not enough on what is needed to 
prevent potential dangers to the health of the patient or others. There are 
good reasons for putting more emphasis on aspects of the public interest and 
the common good, especially with the increasing inclusion of genetic in-
formation in mind. Genetic data is naturally not limited to the individual, 
but instead touches sensitive data protection concerns of past and future 
generations along the family line. If, however, the access to or disclosure of 
genetic information no longer only concerns individual interests, but rather 
group interests—whether of genetically similar family members or third 
parties with the same or a similar genetic predisposition and a medical indi-
cation—a concentration on individual interests is more difficult to justify.
C. Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention
The processing of genetic data can also be highly useful in crime inves-
tigations. DNA found at crime scenes can be matched with existing data-
bases to identify or exonerate persons involved.
206
One of the first time this 
option gained worldwide attention was during the O.J. Simpson trial in the 
early 1990s.
207
Blood found at the crime scene was identified as being O.J. 
204. See Berkman et al., supra note 109, at 57.
205. See Schaefer & Savulescu, supra note 118, at 22.
206. See Zlatko Jakovski et al., The Power of Forensic DNA Data Bases in Solving 
Crime Cases, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETIC SUPP. SER. 275, 275 (2017).
207. O.J. Simpson Trial, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.britannica.com/event/O-J-Simpson-trial.
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Simpson’s by using then-new DNA testing techniques.
208
His eventual ac-
quittal was seen by some as a result of skepticism of the jury towards this 
new type of evidence.
209
Today, DNA testing is the gold standard of crime 
investigation and even after years can help to convict criminals and overturn 
previous convictions. A recent example is the case of the so-called “Golden 
State Killer” suspect Joseph James DeAngelo, a former police officer ac-
cused of the murder of numerous women in the 1970s and 80s.
210
He was 
arrested in 2018 after a match between DNA from the crime scenes and a 
genetic profile belonging to one of his relatives on a website used by people 
trying to find lost family members was found.
211
Going forward, access to 
genetic data and automated matching of DNA profiles can make crime in-
vestigations easier, faster and more efficient.
212
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The developments in medicine and data protection law described in the 
preceding sections of this Article call for a reorientation of data protection 
in the field of healthcare in the twenty-first century. The following policy 
considerations should be taken into account in the context of developing 
healthier data protection regulations and privacy laws.
A. Data Processing Itself Does Not Harm Patients
Data processing as such does not affect individuals adversely.
213
Indi-
viduals can be harmed by inappropriate use of health data, e.g., discrimina-
tion by employers or insurance companies. But data processing can also 
help identify, prove, and counter such inappropriate use through systematic 
monitoring and analysis, e.g., by applying “big data” capabilities to analyze 
hiring and contracting practices of employers and insurance companies. In-
deed, data processing has many important positive effects on individual 
health.
214
208. Michael Caruso et al., O.J. Simpson’s DNA Is Linked to the Murder of Nicole Simp-
son and Ron Goldman in 1994, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nydailynews.com
/news/crime/dna-linked-o-simpson-nicole-ron-goldman-murders-article-1.2760781?barcprox=
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209. See Sarah Sloat, How the O.J. Simpson Trial Created 347 DNA Labs and Public 
Love for Crime Tech, INVERSE (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/13129-how-
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210. See Matt Stevens, California Today: How the Golden State Killer Suspect Was 
Caught, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/us/california-
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212. See Zlatko et al., supra note 206, at 276.
213. See generally Veil, supra note 132.
214. See supra Part V.
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Therefore, the general ban on the processing of personal data in EU da-
ta protection law should be lifted, either generally or at least in the field of 
healthcare and medical research and development. If European lawmakers 
absolutely want to continue with the prohibitive approach of the 1970s, they 
should provide for broader exemptions for healthcare, medical research, and 
medical development. The current debate on the role of data protection in 
medicine tends to focus so heavily on the risks to individual privacy that 
these risks appear to outweigh any benefits for public and individual health. 
Yet, this distorted view fails to consider that discrimination and stigmatiza-
tion are not necessarily consequences of data processing. Instead of regulat-
ing data processing, governments should focus laws and enforcement on 
specific harms and risks.
B. No One Owns Patient Data
Neither patients nor businesses should be granted proprietary rights in 
health data. Calls for data ownership in general,
215
or health information 
specifically,
216
contemplate that patients should own their health data so they 
can trade in data property rights by concluding contracts or assigning rights 
to the data and thus participate in data commercialization and value genera-
tion. Property rights in data are not warranted or helpful to promote innova-
tion or other public goods, they would not benefit individuals, and they 
would suffocate free speech, information freedom, science, commerce and 
technological progress.
217
Data protection law aims to control actual access to personal infor-
mation and - unlike property rights - has neither an incentive nor an invest-
ment protection function. Data “belongs” to patients in the sense that they 
can control access to personal data. The classification of data as economic 
goods and the resulting commercialization and detachment of information 
from the individual (ownership can be transferred, the buyer can exclude the 
215. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, 122-35
(1999); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. ACM 92 (1996); Lawrence Les-
sig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-65 (1999); Tom C.W. 
Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 968 (2012); Patricia Mell, Seek-
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11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal 
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2382-83 (1996); James B. 
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TORONTO L.J. 183, 185 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004); Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property 
Theory, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1062-63 (1993). But see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as In-
tellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000).
216. Digitale Patientenakte bis 2021: Zugriff über eine App / Datenhoheit hat der 
Versicherte, FAZ (Sept. 26, 2018), http://edition.faz.net/faz-edition/wirtschaft/2018-09-27
/digitale-patientenakte-bis-2021/208239.html.
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seller from continued use) is counterproductive to the objectives of privacy 
laws, particularly in the context of health information. In addition, linking 
the use of medical data, which is indispensable for research and develop-
ment, to financial compensation would not only increase the costs for eve-
ryone involved but also further complicate the use of data by research insti-
tutions, which would have to be concerned about invisible encumbrances on 
clinical trial information and individual patient data.
Additional restrictions on access to health data would further hinder the 
development of new medication and treatment methods as only larger com-
panies and research institutions will be able to “afford” data and might not 
be interested in sharing it with others. The individual’s control of her data is 
already ensured by existing data protection laws. Administering transactions 
in data property rights transfers would also necessitate a flood of additional 
information collection and processing and this would further counter the ob-
jectives of privacy laws. No one does or should own data.
218
C. Restrictions on Data Sharing Restricts Competition
Companies are discouraged or even prohibited from sharing personal 
information with other companies under laws like the GDPR and the CCPA. 
For example, companies cannot share video footage compiled on public 
roads to improve child safety for purposes of training autonomous vehicles 
without providing detailed privacy notices, seeking parental consent, and 
granting broad access and deletion rights under the GDPR and the CCPA, 
which make such information gathering impractical for all but the largest
organizations. Consequently, innovative start-ups or smaller research insti-
tutions lose access to important sources of data that they need to develop 
competitive treatments, diagnoses, products, and services. Larger organiza-
tions, on the other hand, accumulate increased market power and can point 
to data privacy laws as a reason to deny other organizations access to infor-
mation as a statutory defense to compliance with competition laws.
D. Focus on Data Security
Many risks associated with health data processing can be countered ef-
fectively by improving data security. Health data must be stored and trans-
mitted in such a way that both unauthorized access by third parties and the 
loss of data are prevented. Researchers, physicians, and medical device 
manufacturers should be encouraged to increase their focus on IT security, 
make or select more secure products, secure their own data processing sys-
tems, and conduct frequent vulnerability tests and audits. HIPAA, CMIA, 
and a new California law regarding connected devices
219
already contain se-
218. Id. at 5, 41.
219. California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04(a) (West 2020).
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curity requirements. Similarly, article 32 of the GDPR and article 22 of the 
BDSG require organizations to maintain a “level of security appropriate to 
the risk.”
220
This obligation applies broadly, including to individual doctors. 
Since 2015, larger hospitals are obligated, as “critical infrastructure,” under 
the German IT Security Act to take state-of-the-art measures under state su-
pervision.
221
Establishing and maintaining a secure data environment requires robust 
administrative, technical, and organizational measures. Physicians need to 
implement internal access protocols or staff training, which can cause extra 
costs and will take time. In the field of information technology in particular, 
the physician will also often need the help of third parties with the appropri-
ate expertise to fulfill these requirements, even if this outsourcing can lead 
to increased risks of unauthorized access to health data. From a technical 
point of view, the realization that complete anonymization of data is practi-
cally difficult to achieve should not prevent data from being encrypted.
222
Data security costs money that is currently spent on data minimization and 
data privacy-related paperwork should be re-applied with a greater focus on 
data security. More and more sophisticated tools are available.
223
Effective data security typically requires additional data processing to 
detect, report, and fight security breaches and perpetrators, to investigate 
data breaches, and to train artificial intelligence. This is another reason to 
loosen data collection bans in European data protection law and to qualify 
or abolish the strict regulations requiring the economic collection of data 
and their prompt deletion in favor of improved data security.
E. Introduce General Electronic Health Records and Consents
In order to use health data more effectively, it is helpful to set up a per-
sonal general patient record that is managed independently by a specific in-
stitution. Scandinavian countries, which have already established similar 
systems, could serve as a model in this regard. Swedish patients, for exam-
ple, can access their complete health records online after setting up an ap-
propriate user account.
224
This could be associated with a right—or possibly 
a duty—for individuals to decide on the use and provision of their own 
220. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 32, 2016 O.J. (L 119/51-52); Bun-
desdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG][Federal Data Protection Act], June 30, 2017, BGBL I at 2097, 
amended by Nov. 20, 2019, BGBL I at 1626, art. 22 (Ger.).
221. Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit Informationstechnischer Systeme [IT-
Sicherheitsegestz] [Law for Increasing the Security of Information Technology Systems], July 
17, 2015, BGBL I, at 1324 (Ger.).
222. See Thorogood et al., supra note 113, at 1.
223. See Price, supra note 185, at 1403, 1443.
224. Stephen Armstrong, Patient Access to Health Records: Striving for the Swedish 
Ideal, 357 BMJ 1 (2017).
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health data.
225
The individual could thus make an independent decision, 
which could range from a total refusal to a consent graded by topic and con-
tent to a broad consent. Such a one-time and general choice would replace 
the dozens of consent forms from different institutions.
Another decision on how to deal with the results of processing the data 
of medically indicated actions, which respects the patient’s right not to 
know, would be necessary. The same applies to the question of how to deal 
with possible secondary uses of these data.
226
In certain contexts, particularly in the field of public health, mandatory 
participation appears to be worth considering.
227
This obligation is based on 
the idea that patients benefit from improved medical knowledge, which in 
turn leads to improved health care from which they benefit. In epidemiolog-
ical research projects on disease control and surveillance in particular, such 
an obligation could be based on arguments of solidarity, the prevention of 
“free-riding,” and, last but not least, the self-interest of the individual.
General, open-ended consents to keep and use general health records 
are at odds with current requirements under the GDPR that consent must be 
specific to be valid.
228
This may be one contributing reason why general 
health records—despite long-standing plans in Germany,
229
for example—
have not yet been realized or made any significant progress in years.
F. Make Requirements for Voluntary Consent More Flexible
To prevent patients from feeling like an anonymous object of medicine, 
a voluntary decision of the person concerned regarding data processing 
should be promoted as much as possible. Yet it is not necessary that the pa-
tient’s decision must be documented in a lengthy, incomprehensible form 
containing all the details required by Articles 12-14 of the GDPR or the 
CCPA. Patients should be able to declare consent in easy-to-understand, 
standardized short forms, for example, in the form of a one-time consent 
concerning access to a general health record. Special provisions for complex 
situations should be permissible, but specificity should not be legally man-
dated. The GDPR contains a statutory exception for research purposes,
230
which contemplates that EU member states can exempt data processing for 
certain medical purposes from GDPR restrictions. It remains to be seen, 
however, if and how the individual EU member states exercise their discre-
225. Ploug & Holm, supra note 142.
226. See Thorogood et al., supra note 113, at 11.
227. See Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in Digital Epidemiolo-
gy?, 14 LIFE SCI. SOC’Y POL’Y 20 (2018).
228. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(11), 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119/34, 37).
229. Digitale Patientenakte bis 2021: Zugriff über eine App/Datenhoheit hat der 
Versicherte, FRANKFURTER ALLEMEINE (Feb. 20, 2019, 9:55 PM), http://edition.faz.net/faz-
edition/wirtschaft/2018-09-27/digitale-patientenakte-bis-2021/208239.html.
230. See Mostert et al., supra note 94, at 960.
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tion and whether organizations will be able to handle the complexities re-
sulting from diverging national legal standards.
For medical research, broad and generic declarations of consent should 
be regularly accepted.
231
The same problem applies to the use of algorithms 
or data aggregating apps that compare data to clarify or prevent an unknown 
medical condition. Overregulating or restricting the use of fitness trackers 
and similar technology—which is already widely adopted today—is coun-
terproductive. Instead, focusing on developing and improving such technol-
ogies should be a policy goal.
232
New consent models are already being discussed using the terms “broad 
consent,” “open consent,” or “dynamic consent.”
233
In order to prevent “ex-
haustion” of the patient through information flooding or to handle the im-
possibility of authorization by deceased patients, there is a need to standard-
ize and simplify the decision-making process. For this purpose, a general 
consent at the beginning of using data without explicit feedback and reau-
thorization would be a good option.
234
Simplifying the use of health data for research purposes also requires a 
more flexible approach to the consent of study participants. Long, highly 
complex consent forms that can hardly cover every conceivable individual 
case are ineffective and benefit neither the medical practice nor the individ-
ual patients. The current legal situation still does not have a concept for 
granting an “extensive consent.” Therefore, changes are necessary, especial-
ly in European data protection law.
235
A “sector-specific consent,” consent 
for certain areas of medicine (monitoring of health data in general, treatment 
of X, research of Y) instead of the common case-specific consent, would 
simplify data processing for medical purposes. This should be considered 
for certain particularly trustworthy facilities, especially beneficial uses or 
relatively harmless data sets.
231. See Christine Grady et al., Broad Consent for Research With Biological Samples: 
Workshop Conclusions, 15 AM. J.BIOETHICS 34, 35 (2015).
232. William Nicholson Price II sees the use of algorithms as the future of medicine. See
Price, supra note 117, at 1401.
233. See e.g., Kristin Solum Steinsbekk et al., Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent
in Biobank Research: Is Passive Participation an Ethical Problem?, 21 EUR. J. HUM.
GENETICS 897, 897 (2013).
234. Christine Grady et al. state that participants of the NIH Clinical Center’s Depart-
ment of Bioethics workshop on broad consent agreed that such “broad consent for research 
use of biospecimens is ethically permissible and, in many cases, optimal.” Grady et al., supra 
note 231, at 40.
235. The already described inconsistency between Articles 4(11), 6(1)(a), and 7 of the 
GDPR on the one hand, see supra Part II(2)(b), and Recital 33 on the other hand is especially 
problematic. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 33, art. 4(11), 6(1)(a), 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119
/6, 34, 36, 37).
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G. Increase Trustworthiness Through Accountability Certifications
While patients tend to have trust in data processing such as the creation 
of a patient record when they see a doctor in person, they tend to be more 
concerned when data processing is conducted without direct interaction with 
a trusted physician or other organization. If there is no chance to actually 
see and supervise the handling of the data, the patient must have confidence 
in the data processing facility. Trust can be built by implementing compre-
hensible accountability requirements for organizations to establish a profes-
sional and responsible health data processing sector. The evaluation of ac-
countability and compliance requires transparent structures.
Policy and law makers should consider creating or endorsing third party 
validation systems to which businesses and other organizations can volun-
tarily submit. Participating organizations could be certified as trustworthy 
participants and gain easier access to health information. Dual and open cer-
tification systems should be considered, including systems certified by gov-
ernments, e.g., data protection authorities, that could audit the practices of 
doctors, hospitals, health insurance companies, medical device manufactur-
ers, research institutions, and other organizations. In return for certification, 
the institutions involved could benefit from a lowering of data protection 
requirements for the declaration of consent.
236
Certification would be open to organizations that can demonstrate a par-
ticular level of integrity and would involve regular accountability and veri-
fication of the documentation of data processing objectives and frameworks 
with regard to access, use, and control mechanisms. Data processing contra-
ry to the terms of the network would be subject to certification or license 
revocation and civil and criminal prosecution to ensure compliance with da-
ta processing rules and to enhance patient confidence.
237
In the case of internationally-operating networks, which require data 
transfer across national borders, there are two options: the network could be 
designed similarly to the European model of binding rules of conduct, 
which allow data to be transferred within a group of companies after the un-
derlying regulations have been certified by European data protection author-
ities. Alternatively, instead of transferring the individual data, the analysis 
process could be transferred, as it has already been tested under the title 
236. Recital 33 of the GDPR already contemplates such approaches: “It is often not pos-
sible to fully identify the purpose of personal data processing for scientific research purposes 
at the time of data collection. Therefore, data subjects should be allowed to give their consent 
to certain areas of scientific research when in keeping with recognized ethical standards for 
scientific research. Data subjects should have the opportunity to give their consent only to 
certain areas of research or parts of research projects to the extent allowed by the intended 
purpose.” Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 33, 2016 O.J. (L 119/6).
237. See generally Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 115.
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DataSHIELD.
238
In this context, the data of the participants in a study are 
stored on individual network computers and processed there according to 
consistent analysis procedures. The results are then transferred in aggregat-
ed and anonymous form so that it is not possible to identify the individual 
participants. This procedure should result in central merging and processing 
of the data.
239
H. Restriction of Data Subject Rights in the 
Case of Pseudonymous Data
The rights of access and deletion of data subjects under current data 
protection law can cause considerable problems for medical research and 
endanger the integrity of the stored data. For this reason, data subjects’
rights should be limited in the case of research involving health data that 
does not include the name of the data subject. Similar to the problem of 
consent to data processing for medical purposes, in many cases the patients 
will not have expertise and insight into data processing, which prevents a 
meaningful exercise of rights. The California Consumer Privacy Act already 
grants an exemption for clinical trial studies and data processing that is cov-
ered by HIPAA or CMIA.
240
However, broader exceptions should be con-
sidered for other types of research.
VII. OUTLOOK
The future of medicine is shaped by digital transformation, innovative 
information technologies such as self-learning algorithms (artificial intelli-
gence) and mass data evaluation (big data), personalization, specification, 
and automated data processing. Moving forward, a treatment considered 
“state-of-the-art” must be “patient-centric,” specifically tailored to the pa-
tient’s lifestyle, her genetic profile, and as many variables as can be reason-
ably assessed. This presents a stark difference to medicine of the past, which 
was more “disease-centric” and focused on the particular illness, its symp-
toms, and known cures.
241
Data allows treatments to be specific, rather than 
standardized. In this way, the ideal of the “right drug for the right patient at 
the right time” could become reality.
242
The success of this transformation 
depends to a large degree on a healthy balance between data protection reg-
ulation, privacy laws, and data access and availability.
238. See Susan E. Wallace et al., Protecting Personal Data in Epidemiological Re-
search: DataSHIELD and UK Law, 17 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 149, 151 (2014).
239. Id. at 150.
240. California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §1798.145(c) (West 2020).
241. See Sherkow & Contreras, supra note 114.
242. Wolfgang Sadee & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized 
Medicine, 14 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 207, 207 (2005).
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Physicians, health insurance companies, scientists, laboratories, medical 
equipment manufacturers, fitness measuring equipment and service provid-
ers, hospital administrations, health authorities, technology companies, and 
other stakeholders must provide adequate disclosures to patients and other 
affected data subjects, respect their informational self-determination, and 
protect their data from unauthorized access and misuse. Failure to do so 
would result in the affected persons and governments losing confidence in 
data collection and processing and opting to reject digital improvement that 
might offer medical progress.
Yet, it is equally, if not more important for individual and public health, 
that physicians, health insurance companies, scientists, laboratories, medical 
equipment manufacturers, fitness measuring equipment makers, service 
providers, hospital administrations, health authorities, technology compa-
nies, and other stakeholders have sufficient access to health information. 
Requirements of EU data protection laws, particularly the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, and U.S. privacy laws restricting data sharing, such 
as the CCPA, threaten to hinder the future of medicine. Undifferentiated da-
ta collection bans, a right to be forgotten, excessive requirements for decla-
rations of consent as well as requirements for reduced data use and data de-
letion slow down development and medical progress.
Excessive data protection can be harmful to health. The German Feder-
al Minister of Health Jens Spahn went as far as saying “[d]ata protection is 
for the healthy,” acknowledging that data protection can become a signifi-
cant obstacle in the process of treating a disease.
243
Professor Roland Eils, 
founding director of the Center for Digital Health at the Berlin Institute of 
Health, warned that excessive data protection threatens lives here and 
now.
244
The fear of stigmatization and discrimination in private, at the work-
place, or by health insurance companies, has resulted in calls for even strict-
er data regulations. Yet policy and lawmakers must consider that further re-
strictions on data processing will also considerably restrict medical progress 
and obstruct opportunities for the medicine of the future.
EU data regulation focuses on banning or minimizing the collection and 
use of personal data based on the simple view that data that is not collected 
in the first place cannot be misused. This approach may have been innova-
tive and worth a try in 1970, when it was first pursued by the German state 
of Hessen with the declared purpose of preventing George Orwell’s vision 
of 1984 from becoming reality. However, the EU still follows this approach 
243. Jens Spahn et al., App vom Arzt: Bessere Gesundheit durch digitale Medizin,
HERDER FREIBURG (2016).
244. Mehr als 8.000 Experten beim Hauptstadtkongress, MEDTECH ZWO 
(May 23, 2019), https://medtech-zwo.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/nachrichten/hauptstadt
kongress-laeuft.html (“Ich würde behaupten, dass ein überzogener Datenschutz jetzt und hier 
in Deutschland Leben gefährdet.”).
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today, and is even doubling down on it with the GDPR at a time when this 
approach seems entirely out of touch with reality. The genie of extensive 
data collection is long out of the bottle and cannot be put inside again. Data, 
including sensitive health information, is everywhere. People record it with 
fitness trackers and smartphones, share it on social media, and leave it on 
servers of online media companies.
Potential privacy risks do not justify a reflexive call for stricter prohibi-
tions of data collection. Such a reaction does not recognize the opportunities 
of data processing and improved data exchange for medicine. Instead, it 
risks turning patients and physicians into adversaries with regard to the col-
lection and processing of health data, despite being largely aligned in regard 
to their interests. Just as a ban on the production of cars is not appropriate to 
prevent an increase in road deaths, bans on data processing are not appro-
priate to fight discrimination or fraud. On the contrary, more and better data 
collection and processing is needed in the interest of data security, law en-
forcement, and medical progress.
The ongoing technical development in the field of medicine and the 
growing focus on the individual as part of more personalized medicine has 
challenged some traditional data protection principles. The increased possi-
bility of re-identification of anonymized health data and the resulting con-
cerns about dwindling privacy may lead to the anonymization of data being 
seen as an additional security tool instead of a method of “detachment” from 
data privacy obligations. However, ways and methods must be found to 
safely preserve the connection between the data and the data subject for the 
benefit of the general public and the individual, not dissolve it. With regard 
to the consent of the individual in the context of medical research, a com-
mon good-oriented view highlighting the advantages of participation for the 
individual should be the preferred way of thinking. With respect to data pro-
tection laws, a cautious approach is appropriate. Where, for example, the 
exercise of data access rights by a person without a background in the medi-
cal field results in access to data that the person cannot understand, it does 
not bring any additional value to the data subject and should not impair the 
scientific work.
The necessary discussion about the “rules of the game” for the data-
based medicine of the future has only just begun. One possible solution is 
the use of instruments that are already in place in current law. However, an 
expedient discussion requires the active participation of physicians, who 
should not leave this future-oriented field to lawyers and politicians alone. 
Treating and researching physicians are the ones who can explain complex 
interactions in medical research and build trust. With the future of medicine 
in mind, in which the protection of personal data is more than an end in it-
self, their participation in the legal discussion is essential.
The future of medicine offers enormous opportunities and requires a 
healthy level of data protection. As in drug therapy, the dose makes the poi-
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son.
245
When regulation and reduction of the collection and processing of 
data goes too far, data protection might end up killing more patients than 
hospital germs.
245. Pracelsus said, “Sola dosis facit venenum” (all things are poison and nothing is 
without poison; only the dose makes a thing not a poison). F J T Staal, et. al., Sola Dosis Facit 
Venenum. Leukemia in Gene Therapy Trials: A Question of Vectors, Inserts and Dosage?, 22 
LEUKEMIA 1849, 1849 (2008).
